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Note 
Regulatory Imperialism: 
The Worldwide Export of European 
Regulatory Principles on Credit Rating 
Agencies 
Kristina St. Charles* 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are widely cited as key 
contributors to the recent global financial crisis, particularly for 
their role in the growth of the asset-backed securities debt 
market.1 As originally envisioned, collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) and related structured finance products were designed 
to reduce investor risk through diversification.2 Changes in the 
expected default rates among subprime mortgages in 2007 
combined with declining property values actually concentrated 
investor risk and created considerable uncertainty.3 This 
uncertainty led to a liquidity crisis among some institutional 
investors, and as the crisis worsened CRAs downgraded billions 
of dollars worth of subprime residential mortgage backed 
securities (RMBSs) and CDOs.4 
Credit rating agencies are companies that evaluate the risk 
of issuers and individual debt instruments.5 To assess the credit 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., Northwestern 
University, 2008. 
 1. See generally Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 
27, 2008, at 36. 
 2. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON THE SUBPRIME CRISIS, 43 (2008), available at http://www.iasplus.com/ 
iosco/0805ioscosubprimereport.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO, REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE]. 
 3. Id. at 3–4. 
 4. Id. at 4–5. 
 5. STANDARD & POOR’S FIN. SVCS., GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS 3 
(2009), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/ 
SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf. Issuers include corporations, financial institutions, 
national governments, states, cities, and municipalities. Id. at 7. 
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risk of issuers, the CRAs analyze both financial and non-
financial factors, including economic circumstances, corporate 
governance attributes, and key performance indicators.6 The 
conclusions derived from this analysis are then reflected in a 
credit rating. This credit rating is an opinion about the credit 
risk of the issue or issuer, and reflects the CRA’s opinion as to 
the likelihood that the issuer will be able to meet its financial 
obligation or that the debt instrument will default.7 Credit 
ratings are not absolute measures of default probability, are not 
intended to indicate the value of merit of an investment, and are 
not recommendations to buy or sell a security.8 Despite CRAs 
stressing that their ratings are simply opinions, investors have 
relied heavily on these ratings as their method of assessing the 
credit risk of RMBSs and CDOs.9 As a result, when CRA ratings 
of these instruments were questioned due to the high level of 
downgrades, investors did not have an independent way to 
assess the securities’ risks, causing the market for the securities 
to dislocate.10 
Despite the importance of credit rating agencies in most 
modern capital markets, CRAs remained primarily self-
regulated until fairly recently.11 Regulators first began taking 
notice of CRAs after they failed to downgrade Enron until very 
shortly before its collapse.12 International securities regulators 
were the first to take action by promulgating a non-binding code 
of conduct for CRAs in 2004.13 In 2006, the United States passed 
 
 6. Id. at 11–12 (additionally considering competitive trends, product mix 
considerations, research and development prospects, patent rights, and labor 
relations). For an assessment of individual issues CRAs evaluate credit quality and 
likelihood of default based on information concerning the legal structure, relative 
seniority of the issuer with regard to the issuer’s other debts, and the existence of 
external support or credit enhancements. See id. 
 7. Id. at 12. 
 8. Id. at 3. 
 9. IOSCO, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 23. Reasons for over-
reliance on ratings included the complexity of the structured finance products, the 
limited historical performance data available on some types of assets underlying the 
RMBSs, and the lack of universally understood valuation methods and price 
discovery mechanism in the secondary market. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID GREEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE 
ESSENTIAL GUIDE 67–68 (2008). 
 12. Id. at 68–69. 
 13. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, CODE OF CONDUCT 
FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2004), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO, 
CODE OF CONDUCT]. 
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the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act,14 becoming the first 
jurisdiction in the world to implement binding regulations on 
CRAs.15 The European Union passed the most comprehensive 
regulation of CRAs to date in April 2009, which is set to go into 
effect beginning in December 2010.16 
This Note analyzes the current regulatory regimes of the 
United States and the European Union, and the practical effects 
these regulations will have on credit rating agencies worldwide. 
Part I briefly outlines the history of credit rating agency 
regulation in the United States and the European Union, as 
well as the actions taken by international securities regulators. 
Part II compares the regulation passed by the European Union 
to current regulations in the United States, focusing on five 
areas: the scope of the regulations, corporate governance and 
conflicts of interest, methodologies and quality of credit ratings, 
disclosure and transparency, and structured finance 
instruments. Part II argues that in order to eliminate the 
potential extraterritorial and anticompetitive effects of the 
European Union’s regulation, regulators in the European Union 
must find that the regulatory regime currently in place in the 
United States is equivalent to that of the European Union. This 
Note concludes that further bilateral dialogues on the 
implementation of the EU regulations are necessary to 
eliminate the potentially adverse cross-border impact that 
differing regulatory approaches in the United States and 
European Union could have on global market participants. 
I. FROM SELF-REGULATION TO AN INTRICATE 
REGULATORY REGIME: THE EVOLUTION OF CREDIT 
RATING AGENCY REGULATION 
A. REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Since the early twentieth century, CRAs have provided 
 
 14. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 
1327 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 15. Pavlos Maris, The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the US and 
Europe: Historical Analysis and Thoughts on the Road Ahead 11 (July 15, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434504; see 
generally Deniz Coskun, Credit Rating Agencies in a Post-Enron World: Congress 
Revisits the NRSRO Concept, 9 J. OF BANKING REG., 264, 264–283 (2008). 
 16. Council Regulation 1060/2009, art. 41, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 1–31 (EC). 
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ratings on the creditworthiness of issuers of securities and 
individual debt instruments.17 Over time the development of 
increasingly complex financial products, such as asset-backed 
securities, and the globalization of financial markets 
significantly increased the importance and influence of CRAs.18 
Despite performing a crucial function in international capital 
markets, CRAs have not been subject to the same regulatory 
scrutiny as securities firms or banks,19 remaining largely self-
regulated within the United States. 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or 
Commission) first began recognizing the ratings of certain CRAs 
in its federal securities regulations in 1975, designating firms as 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs) for purposes of its net capital rules.20 Over the years, 
the concept of NRSROs was further incorporated into numerous 
SEC rules, granting favorable regulatory treatment to 
institutions whose portfolio holdings consisted of securities 
rated highly by NRSROs.21 
The term NRSRO was not defined in any of these rules and 
regulations. Instead, the SEC issued no-action letters granting 
recognition of NRSRO status on a case-by-case basis, originally 
only to Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (Moody’s), Standard and 
Poor’s Corporation (S&P) and Fitch Investors Service, Inc. 
 
 17. The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the U.S. Securities Markets: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 131 (2002) [hereinafter 
Role of CRAs Hearing] (statement of Issac C. Hunt, Comm’r, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission). 
 18. Id. at 131. 
 19. See DAVIES & GREEN, supra note 11, at 68. 
 20. See Adoption of Amendments to Rule 15c3-1 and Adoption of Alternative 
Net Capital Requirements for Certain Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release 
No. 11497, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,795 (July 16, 1975) (incorporating the term “NRSRO” for 
determining capital charges on different grades of debt securities under the net 
capital rule). “The net capital rule requires broker-dealers, when computing net 
capital, to deduct from their net worth certain percentages of the market value 
(‘haircuts’) of their proprietary securities positions . . . to provide a margin of safety 
against losses that might be incurred by broker-dealers as a result of market 
fluctuations.” Role of CRAs Hearing, supra note 17, at 132 (statement of Issac C. 
Hunt, Comm’r, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 21. See, e.g., SEC Money Market Funds Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(9) (2009) 
(exempting money market funds from certain valuation requirements if their 
portfolios are limited to securities with particular NRSRO ratings); SEC Forms for 
Registration Statements, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (2009) (allowing non-convertible debt 
securities rated investment grade by at least one NRSRO to be registered on Form 
S-3 and forego other regulations). 
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(Fitch).22 A rating agency’s designation as an NRSRO “did not 
carry any implication that the SEC approved the ratings 
methodologies, or had any oversight of the agencies’ 
operations.”23 Instead, the SEC determined whether a CRA 
should be designated an NRSRO by asking whether the rating 
agency was widely accepted in the United States as an issuer of 
credible and reliable ratings.24 As a result, the designation was 
“intended largely to reflect the view of the marketplace as to the 
credibility of the ratings, rather than represent a ‘seal of 
approval’ of a federal regulatory agency.”25 
Enron’s collapse in 2001 pushed regulation of CRAs to the 
forefront, in large part because Enron’s rating remained at 
investment grade until four days before the company went 
bankrupt.26 Congress quickly began investigating the role of 
CRAs in Enron’s collapse,27 finding a lack of diligence in the 
CRAs’ assessments of Enron as the primary cause of Enron’s 
erroneous investment grade rating.28 Based on these findings, 
 
 22. See Letter from Gregory C. Yadley, Staff Attorney, Div. of Mkt. Regulation, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Ralph L. Gosselin, Treasurer, Couglin and Co., Inc. 
(Nov. 24, 1975), 1975 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2602. Between 1975 and 1992, only four 
other rating agencies were given NRSRO status: Duff and Phelps, Inc., McCarthy 
Crisanti & Maffei, Inc., IBCA Limited and its subsidiary, IBCA, Inc., and Thomson 
BankWatch, Inc, all of which have since merged with or been acquired by another 
agency. See Role of CRAs Hearing, supra note 17, at 134 (statement of Issac C. 
Hunt, Comm’r, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 23. DAVIES & GREEN, supra note 11, at 68. 
 24. See Role of CRAs Hearing, supra note 17, at 133 (statement of Issac C. 
Hunt, Comm’r, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 25. Id. at 133. 
 26. See Edward Wyatt, Credit Rating Agencies Waited Months to Voice Doubt 
About Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at C1.  
 27. On March 20, 2002 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held a 
hearing with representatives from the major CRAs as well as the then-SEC 
Commissioner and various law professors. See Rating the Raters: Enron and the 
Credit Rating Agencies: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 
107th Cong. 8 (2002) (testimony of John C. Diaz, Managing Director, Power and 
Energy Group, Moody’s Investor Service). In addition, on July 23, 2002, 
representatives from Moody’s and S&P testified regarding their role in Enron’s 
misleading structured finance transactions. See The Role of the Financial 
Institutions in Enron’s Collapse: Hearings Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations of the S. Governmental Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. 278 (2002) (joint 
statement of John C. Diaz, Managing Director, Power and Energy Group, Moody’s 
Investor Service & Pamela M. Stumpp, Managing Director, Chief Credit Officer, 
Corporate Finance Group, Moody’s Investor Service); id. at 282 (statement of Ronald 
M. Barone, Managing Director, Utilities, Energy and Project Finance Group, 
Corporate and Government Ratings, Standard and Poor’s Financial Service). 
 28. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., 
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 89–98 
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Congress called for the direct regulation of CRAs by the SEC.29 
Over the next few years, Congress conducted additional 
investigations,30 culminating in the SEC’s proposal of a 
definition of NRSRO in 2005.31 
In 2006 Congress responded by enacting the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act of 2006 (Rating Agency Act),32 signaling the 
first formal regulation of CRAs in the United States. The Rating 
Agency Act defines the term “NRSRO” and provides authority 
for the Commission to implement rules regarding the 
registration, recordkeeping, financial reporting, and oversight of 
CRAs.33 The Rating Agency Act also outlines registration 
 
(Comm. Print 2002) [hereinafter FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON]; see also, STAFF 
OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., ENRON’S CREDIT RATING: 
ENRON’S BANKERS’ CONTACTS WITH MOODY’S AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 2–17 
(Comm. Print 2003).  
 29. FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON, supra note 28, at 98–100. 
 30. For example, the Commission, pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
issued the Report on the Role and Function of CRAs in the Operation of Securities 
Markets in January 2003. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND 
FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES 
MARKETS (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf. 
This report listed multiple issues in need of further study. See id. at 1–2 (listing 
information flow, potential conflicts of interest, alleged anticompetitive or unfair 
practices, reducing potential regulatory barriers to entry and ongoing oversight as 
issues requiring further study). The SEC subsequently issued a Concept Release, 
calling for comment on these issues. See Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit 
Ratings Under Federal Securities Laws, Securities Act Release No. 8236, Exchange 
Act Release No. 47,972, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,066, 68 Fed. Reg. 
35,258 (June 12, 2003). 
 31. See Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 
Securities Act Release No. 8570, Exchange Act Release No. 51,572, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,834, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306 (proposed Apr. 19, 2005). The 
proposed definition of NRSRO is an entity: 
(i) that issues publicly available credit ratings that are current 
assessments of the creditworthiness of obligors with respect to specific 
securities or money market instruments; (ii) is generally accepted in the 
financial markets as an issuer of credible and reliable ratings, including 
ratings for a particular industry or geographic segment, by the 
predominant users of securities ratings; and (iii) uses systematic 
procedures designated to ensure credible and reliable ratings, manage 
potential conflicts of interest, and prevent the misuse of nonpublic 
information, and has sufficient financial resources to ensure compliance 
with those procedures. 
Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. at 
21,310. 
 32. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 
1327 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 33. Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 55,857, 72 Fed. Reg. 
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procedures for NRSROs34 and calls for almost all the 
information submitted in a CRA’s registration application to be 
available to the public.35 Perhaps most importantly, the Rating 
Agency Act specifically prohibits the SEC from regulating “the 
substance of credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies 
by which any nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization determines credit ratings.”36 
The rules enacted by the SEC in 200737 pursuant to the 
Rating Agency Act require CRAs seeking registration as 
NRSROs to follow certain procedures,38 and require NRSROs to 
make and retain certain records,39 file annual financial 
 
33,564 (June 5, 2007). NRSRO is defined as: 
A credit rating agency that: (A) has been in business as a credit rating 
agency for at least the 3 consecutive years immediately preceding the date 
of its application for registration under section 15E; (B) issues credit 
ratings certified by qualified institutional buyers, in accordance with 
section 15E(a)(1)(B)(ix), with respect to – (i) financial institutions, brokers 
or dealers; (ii) insurance companies; (iii) corporate issuers; (iv) issuers of 
asset-backed securities . . . (v) issuers of government securities, municipal 
securities, or securities issued by a foreign government; or (vi) a 
combination of one or more categories of obligors described in any clauses 
(i) through (v); (C) is registered under section 15E. 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act § 3 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(62)). 
 34. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act § 4 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1) 
to require, among other things, disclosure of performance measurement statistics, 
procedures and methodologies, policies, organizational structure, and conflicts of 
interest in applications for registration as an NRSRO). 
 35. See id. (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(3) to allow lists of the twenty largest 
issuers and subscribers of credit rating services, amount of net revenues received 
therefrom, and written certifications in registration applications from institutional 
buyers to remain confidential). 
 36. Id. (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2)). The SEC finds this provision to 
strike the proper balance between promoting competition and policing NRSRO 
activities without second-guessing the quality of the CRAs’ ratings. See The Role 
and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime Credit Markets: Hearing 
Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 48 (2007) 
[hereinafter Role and Impact Hearing] (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 37. Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations, 72 Fed. Reg. at 33,564. 
 38. See SEC Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization 
Registration Rule, 17 C.F.R § 240.17g-1 (2009) (effective Feb. 1, 2010) (requiring 
registration, annual certification, and the furnishing of form NRSRO). 
 39. See id. § 240.17g-2 (requiring records on the identities of credit analysts 
that participated in determining the credit rating, the identity of the person who 
approved the credit rating, whether the credit rating was solicited or unsolicited, 
financial reports, compliance reports, internal audit plans, credit analysis reports, 
and documentation of complaints, among other things). 
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reports,40 implement written policies and procedures to prevent 
the misuse of material nonpublic information,41 and disclose 
conflicts of interest.42 NRSROs are also prohibited from 
engaging in unfair, coercive, or abusive practices.43 
Shortly after these rules were implemented CRAs began 
receiving heavy criticism regarding the accuracy of the ratings 
of structured finance products, specifically subprime RMBSs 
and CDOs,44 as thousands of ratings of RMBSs and CDOs worth 
billions of dollars were downgraded.45 The massive downgrades 
led to market uncertainty and a general reduction in market 
liquidity.46 According to the SEC, a primary flaw in the rating 
process is the fact that arrangers of RMBSs and CDOs would 
inform the CRAs of the rating they wished to obtain for each 
product and the credit analysts would simply check whether the 
assets were sufficient to support the desired rating.47 
 
 40. See id. § 240.17g-3. 
 41. See id. § 240.17g-4. 
 42. See id. § 240.17g-5. 
 43. See id. § 240.17g-6. 
 44. See Role and Impact Hearing, supra note 36, at 49 (statement of 
Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission); id. at 53–
60 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor, Columbia University Law School); see 
also Elliot Blair Smith, Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime 
Scourge, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601109&sid=ah839IWTLP9s; Joshua Rosner, Op-Ed., Stopping the 
Subprime Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2007, at A19; Lowenstein, supra note 1. 
 45. See DANIELLE NAZARIAN & MARIA MIAGKOVA, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV., 
CREDIT MIGRATION OF CDO NOTES, 1996-2007, FOR US AND EUROPEAN 
TRANSACTIONS 2 (2008), available at http://www.moodys.com/cust/content/ 
content.ashx?source=StaticContent/Free%20pages/Credit%20Policy%20Research/ 
documents/current/2007100000486949.pdf (reporting 1448 tranche downgrades in 
515 CDOs during 2007, nine times the number of tranches downgraded in 2006); 
RAMKI MUTHUKRISHNAN & KATE SCANLIN, STANDARD & POOR’S FIN. SERVS., 78 
RATINGS LOWERED ON 16 U.S. CDOS OF ABS; $14.871 BILLION IN ISSUANCE 
AFFECTED 2 (2008), available at http://www2.standardsandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/ 
subprime_78cdo_073108.pdf (reporting that as of July 31, 2008, S&P had 
downgraded $376.792 billion in CDO issuance); Glenn Costello, Fitch Ratings, 
PowerPoint: Update on U.S. RMBS: Performance, Expectations, Criteria 6 (2008), 
http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/sectors/subprime/us_rmbs_update_feb08.pdf 
(reporting downgrading $23.8 billion worth of subprime RMBS tranches issued in 
2006 and the first quarter of 2007). 
 46. The State of the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 13–14 (2008), 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id= 
9e0f8915-32d6-425e-8e77-7b9ce0e555b7 (statement of John C. Dugan, Comptroller 
of the Currency). 
 47. See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 57,967, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212 (proposed 
June 25, 2008). 
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Additionally, investigators found many factors contributed to 
the inaccurate ratings of RMBSs and CDOs, including: 
perceived lack of transparency,48 underestimation of credit risk 
and faulty assumptions underlying rating methodologies,49 as 
well as conflicts of interest in the “issuer pays” model, high 
market concentration of CRAs, and the prospect of retaliation by 
arrangers.50 
Based on these concerns, the SEC promulgated various rule 
amendments imposing additional requirements on NRSROs in 
June 2008.51 The SEC adopted the majority of these 
amendments, with revisions, in February 2009 intending to 
increase the transparency of rating methodologies, strengthen 
the disclosure of ratings performances, prohibit NRSROs from 
engaging in particular practices that create conflicts of interest, 
and enhance recordkeeping and reporting obligations.52 All 
NRSROs were required to comply with the majority of these 
 
 48. The State of the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 7 (2008), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id= 
093111d0-c4fe-47f3-a87a-b103f0513f7a (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). 
 49. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., POLICY STATEMENT ON 
FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 16 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ 
press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf. 
 50. See  Role and Impact Hearing, supra note 36, at 3–7 (statement of John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Professor, Columbia University Law School). 
 51. Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 
73 Fed. Reg. at 36,212 (implementing further regulations “in order to address 
concerns about the integrity of [CRAs’] credit rating procedures and methodologies 
in the light of the role they played in determining credit ratings for securities 
collateralized by or linked to subprime residential mortgages.”). 
 52. See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 59,342, 74 Fed. Reg. 6456 (Feb. 9, 2009). 
Specifically, the rule amendments require:  
(1) an NRSRO to provide enhanced disclosure of performance 
measurements statistics and the procedures and methodologies used by the 
NRSRO in determining credit ratings for structured finance products and 
other debt securities on Form NRSRO; (2) an NRSRO to make, keep, and 
preserve additional records under Rule 17g-2; (3) an NRSRO to make 
publicly available on its Internet Web site in XBRL format a random 
sample of 10% of the ratings histories of credit ratings paid for by the 
obligor being rated or by the issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of the security 
being rated (“issuer-paid credit ratings”) in each class of credit ratings for 
which it has issued 500 or more issuer-paid credit ratings, with each new 
ratings action to be reflected in such histories no later than six months 
after they are taken; and (4) an NRSRO to furnish the Commission with an 
additional annual report. 
Id. at 6469. 
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amendments beginning April 10, 2009.53 Additional rule 
amendments adopted by the SEC on November 23, 2009 
implement new requirements for ratings of structured finance 
products and require broader disclosure of credit rating 
histories.54 The SEC has also issued proposed rules on 
disclosure of compliance reviews and revenue sources, and is 
soliciting comments regarding new rules related to ratings of 
structured finance instruments.55 
B. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES  
As international financial markets became more complex 
and CRAs began issuing ratings across borders, international 
regulatory agencies responded by developing detailed informal 
systems to coordinate regulation efforts. The International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)56 first took 
notice of CRAs in 2003 when it issued its Report on the 
Activities of Credit Rating Agencies57 and corresponding 
Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies 
(Principles).58 The IOSCO Principles “state high-level objectives 
for which ratings agencies, regulators, issuers and other market 
 
 53. See id. at 6456. The amendment to Rule 17g-2(d) did not go into effect until 
September 9, 2009. See Order Providing NRSROs a Temporary Exemption from the 
Requirement in Rule 17g-2(d), Exhange Act Release No. 60,473, 74 Fed. Reg. 41,176, 
41,177 (Aug. 14, 2009). 
 54. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 61,050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832–35 (Dec. 4, 
2009). 
 55. Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 
Exchange Act Release No. 61,051, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,866 (proposed Dec. 4, 2009) 
(deferring consideration of a proposed rule that would require a report describing 
credit rating procedures and methodologies and credit risk characteristics for 
structured finance products, and soliciting comment regarding methods to 
differentiate ratings of structured finance products). 
 56. IOSCO is recognized as the international standard-setter for securities 
markets, with IOSCO members regulating more than 90% of the world’s securities 
in over 100 jurisdictions. See About IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/ 
index.cfm?section=history (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
 57. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REPORT ON THE 
ACTIVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/ 
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD153.pdf (providing an overview of key issues for 
regulators, citing CRA independence and conflicts of interest, issuers and 
disclosures, public dissemination of ratings and market timing, preferential 
subscriber access to information, and unsolicited ratings as the greatest issues 
facing regulators). 
 58. TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2003), 
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD151.pdf. 
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participants should strive in order to improve investor 
protection and the fairness, efficiency and transparency of the 
securities markets and reduce systemic risk.”59 The Principles 
cover four primary areas: (1) quality and integrity of the rating 
process; (2) independence and conflicts of interests; (3) 
transparency and timelines of ratings disclosure; and (4) 
confidential information.60  
In 2004, IOSCO published a Code of Conduct Fundamentals 
for Credit Rating Agencies (IOSCO Code of Conduct or Code)61 
to serve as a guide and framework for how CRAs should 
implement the Principles in their individual codes of conduct;62 
the “Code is the international consensus on what regulators 
expect of CRAs with regard to: (1) transparency; (2) conflicts of 
interest; (3) CRA obligations to the investing public and issuers; 
(4) quality and integrity of the rating process; and (5) treatment 
of non-public information.”63 The IOSCO Code of Conduct is also 
intended to serve as a template for regulation to avoid conflicts 
of law between different approaches to CRA regulation by 
individual jurisdictions.64 For these goals to be met, individual 
CRAs must incorporate the IOSCO Code of Conduct into their 
own codes of conduct. However, in 2007 IOSCO found that while 
the largest CRAs had implemented the Code extensively, many 
small and mid-sized firms had either only partially 
implemented the Code, or simply not implemented it at all.65 
IOSCO has no power to force CRAs to implement the Code; it 
can merely provide guidance for self-regulation or a basis for 
 
 59. Id. at 1. 
 60. See id. at 2–4. 
 61. IOSCO, CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 13. 
 62. See id. at 2. 
 63. Letter from Greg Tanzer, Sec’y Gen., IOSCO, to Mario Draghi, Chairman, 
Fin. Stability Forum, Tiff Macklem, Assoc. Deputy Minister, Can. Dep’t of Fin., and 
Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India (June 30, 2008) in 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS & THE U.S. SECURITIES 
LAWS 2009: STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 1167 
(2009). 
 64. See id. at 1168. 
 65. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, CONSULTATION 
REPORT: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IOSCO FUNDAMENTALS OF A CODE OF 
CONDUCT FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 15 (2007), available at http://www.iosco.org/ 
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD233.pdf. Many of the CRAs contained in IOSCO’s 
implementation review submitted comments clarifying or explaining their 
implementation. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, COMMENTS 
RECEIVED ON THE CONSULTATION REPORT: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
IOSCO FUNDAMENTALS OF A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
(2007), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD249.pdf. 
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laws established in individual jurisdictions.66 
As the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States 
triggered extensive worldwide market disruption, international 
securities bodies increased their scrutiny of CRAs. In October 
2007, the G-7 tasked the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) with 
analyzing the underlying causes of the crisis, including, among 
other things, an examination of the methodologies and role of 
CRAs in structured finance transactions.67 The FSF report 
called for changing the role and use of credit ratings to enhance 
the resilience of the global system and preserve the advantages 
of integrated global financial markets.68 The report also 
recommended that IOSCO revise its CRA Code of Conduct and 
CRAs quickly revise their own codes of conduct accordingly.69 
IOSCO also conducted an inquiry into the role of CRAs in 
structured finance markets.70 Based on this analysis and the 
proposals put forth by the FSF, IOSCO released its revised CRA 
Code of Conduct in May 2008,71 implementing numerous 
 
 66. See OLIVER VON SCHWEINITZ, RATING AGENCIES: THEIR BUSINESS, 
REGULATION, AND LIABILITY UNDER U.S., U.K., AND GERMAN LAW 10–11 (2007) 
(describing IOSCO’s Code of Conduct as “soft-law”). 
 67. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement of G-7 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Oct. 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp625.htm. 
 68. See FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON 
ENHANCING MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE 2 (2008), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0804.pdf (additionally proposing 
the strengthening of prudential oversight of capital, liquidity and risk management, 
enhancing transparency and valuation, strengthening the authorities’ 
responsiveness to risks, and creating robust arrangements for dealing with stress in 
the financial system). 
 69. See id. at 34. The FSF also suggested that CRAs allocate adequate 
resources to both the initial rating and the rating’s regular review, differentiate the 
rating symbols used for structured products from those used on bonds, expand the 
initial and ongoing information provided on risk characteristics of structured 
products, and enhance review of the quality of the data input and due diligence 
performed on structured products. See id. at 34–37. The FSF further asked investors 
to address their over-reliance on ratings, and asked authorities to review their use of 
ratings in regulatory and supervisory frameworks. See id. at 37–38. 
 70. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, FINAL REPORT ON THE 
ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS (2008), 
available at http://www.cmvm.pt/NR/rdonlyres/85312A11-A927-4F63-810A-
082C1A2CF5F8/9759/RelIOSCOsobrePapelCRAMercProdEstrut.pdf [hereinafter 
IOSCO, FINAL REPORT] (finding that the IOSCO Code of Conduct should be modified 
to better address CRA transparency and market perceptions, independence and 
avoidance of conflicts of interest, and CRA competition and the interaction this 
competition may have on CRA independence). 
 71. TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, CODE OF CONDUCT 
FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2008), available at 
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changes, many of which were aimed at how CRAs conduct 
themselves with regard to ratings of structured finance 
products.72 Additionally, IOSCO sought greater international 
coordination of CRA oversight, asking “legislators to consider 
the regulatory consensus represented by the IOSCO Code of 
Conduct when framing legislation as any fragmentation runs 
the risk of a reoccurrence of problems with product ratings.”73 
Despite this recommendation, regulatory gaps became evident 
in the midst of the economic crisis.74 In response, the G-20 called 
for immediate action by March 31, 2009: 
Regulators should take steps to ensure that credit rating agencies 
meet the highest standards of [ISOCO] and that they avoid conflicts of 
interest, provide greater disclosure to investors and to issuers, and 
differentiate ratings for complex products. This will help ensure that 
credit rating agencies have the right incentives and appropriate 
oversight to enable them to perform their important role in providing 
unbiased information and assessments to markets. [IOSCO] should 
review credit rating agencies’ adoption of the standards mechanisms 
for monitoring compliance.75 
Pursuant to the G-20’s directive, IOSCO issued a review of 
the implementation of the revised IOSCO CRA Code in March 
2009,76 finding that the largest CRAs had substantially 
implemented the revisions, but that two-thirds of the CRAs 
surveyed had not addressed the revisions at all.77 In April 2009, 
 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD271.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO, 
REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT]. 
 72. See Letter from Greg Tanzer to Mario Draghi, Tiff Macklem, and Rakesh 
Mohan, supra note 63, at 1168. 
 73. Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Urges Greater 
International Coordination in the Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies (Sept. 17, 
2008), available at http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS126.pdf. 
 74. See Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Open Letter to G-20 
Summit (Nov.12, 2008), available at http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/ 
IOSCONEWS133.pdf (highlighting the risks posed by unregulated and under-
regulated parts of the global market). 
 75. GROUP OF TWENTY, DECLARATION: SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
THE WORLD ECONOMY: ACTION PLAN TO IMPLEMENT PRINCIPLES OF REFORM 2 (2008), 
available at http://www.g20.org/documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf. 
 76. TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, A REVIEW OF 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IOSCO CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT 
RATING AGENCIES (2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ 
IOSCOPD286.pdf. 
 77. See id. at 8 (citing several possible reasons why the revised code had not 
been adopted, including the European Commission’s proposed regulation, resource 
constraints, and the fact that many of the revisions were aimed at addressing 
concerns with structured finance product ratings, which many smaller CRAs do not 
offer). 
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the G-20 implemented an action plan for global recovery and 
reform and agreed to “extend regulatory oversight and 
registration to Credit Rating Agencies to ensure they meet the 
international code of good practice, particularly to prevent 
unacceptable conflicts of interest.”78 
IOSCO recently developed a model for IOSCO members 
who regulate and inspect CRAs intended to create “a common 
understanding of the types of information that regulators 
around the world will find useful when inspecting a CRA 
against regulatory requirements based on the IOSCO CRA 
Code.”79 Additionally, the IOSCO Task Force on Credit Rating 
Agencies is being converted into a permanent standing 
committee in order to facilitate the convergence of regulatory 
approaches to CRAs.80 The G-20 continues to focus on 
strengthening oversight of CRAs, and progress is being made 
worldwide.81 
C. REGULATION OF CRAS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
The European Union (EU or Community) also took notice of 
CRAs after Enron’s collapse raised a number of international 
policy issues.82 At the Oviedo Informal Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council in April 2002, the European Commission (EC) 
called for a cross-sectoral policy assessment to determine 
whether regulatory intervention in the area of CRAs was 
 
 78. GROUP OF TWENTY, GLOBAL PLAN FOR RECOVERY AND REFORM 4 (2009), 
available at http://www.g20.org/documents/final-communique.pdf. 
 79. Letter from Greg Tanzer to Mario Draghi, Tiff Macklem, and Rakesh 
Mohan, supra note 63, at 1168 (covering areas such as quality and integrity of the 
rating process, analyst and employee independence, and compliance). 
 80. See Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Update on Credit 
Rating Agency Oversight 3–4 (Mar. 12, 2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/ 
news/pdf/IOSCONEWS138.pdf (describing the permanent standing committee and 
the purposes it hopes to accomplish). 
 81. See U.S. CHAIR OF THE PITTSBURGH G-20 SUMMIT, PROGRESS REPORT ON 
THE ACTIONS TO PROMOTE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 18–19 (2009), available 
at http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_progress_report_250909.pdf (finding 
that progress has been made with CRAs incorporating the Revised IOSCO Code of 
Conduct, and finding that regulators are working together to obtain compatible 
regulatory obligations for CRAs). 
 82. See European Comm’n, Internal Mkt. and Serv. Directorate Gen. [DG 
MARKT], Note for the Informal ECOFIN Council in Oviedo, Spain: A First Response 
to Enron Related Policy Issues, 1, (2002) (prepared by Frits Bolkestein), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/enron/ecofin_2004_04_enron_en.pdf 
(listing financial reporting, statutory audit, corporate governance, transparency in 
the international financial system, financial analysts’ research, and the role of 
rating agencies as issues of concern in the EU). 
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necessary within the EU.83 The European Parliament’s 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs investigated the 
role of CRAs in European capital markets, concluding that 
“rating agencies active in Europe should be asked to register 
with a European Union Ratings Authority.”84 Based on this 
report, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for 
the EC to assess whether such a registration scheme should be 
established and whether regulatory legislation was needed.85 
In March 2004, the EC presented the European Securities 
Committee86 with four main issues of concern: (1) the legal 
treatment of rating agencies’ access to inside information; (2) 
the transparency of rating methodologies; (3) the lack of 
competition among CRAs; and (4) conflicts of interest within 
rating agencies.87 The EC then called on the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR)88 to provide the EC 
with technical advice related to those four issues.89 CESR issued 
a comprehensive report in March 2005 stating, among other 
things, that they did not think EU rules should extend beyond 
the IOSCO Code of Conduct, and that the IOSCO Code of 
 
 83. Id. at 7. 
 84. Commission’s Report on Role and Methods of Rating Agencies, at 11,  
A5-0040/2004 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2004-0040+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
(supporting the explanatory statement of the Motion for a Resolution on Role and 
Method of Rating Agencies 2003/2081(INI)). 
 85. Resolution on Role and Methods of Rating Agencies, EUR. PARL. DOC. 
2003/2081(INI) 5 (2004) (provisional edition). The European Parliament also called 
upon the Commission to work closely with IOSCO and other securities market 
regulators to ensure any developments are globally consistent. Id. at 5. 
 86. The European Securities Committee, run by the European Commission, 
was formed in 2001 and provides advice on policy issues in the securities field. 
European Commission, European Securities Committee, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/securities/esc/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2010). 
 87. See European Comm’n, European Sec. Comm., Summary Record of the 19th 
Meeting of the European Securities Committee/Alternates, 6, ESC 10/2004 (Mar. 15, 
2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esc/meetings/ 
2004-03-report_en.pdf. 
 88. The Committee of European Securities Regulators was formed in 2001 as 
an independent advisory body to advise the Commission on technical details of 
securities litigation. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Financial Services: 
Commission Creates Two New Committees on Securities 2 (June 6, 2001), available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/ 
792&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN. 
 89. See European Comm’n, Call to CESR for Technical Advice on Possible 
Measures Concerning Credit Rating Agencies (July 27, 2004), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/agencies/2004-07-27-advice_en.pdf 
(asking CESR for advice on specific questions to assess the need for legislation or 
other solutions). 
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Conduct will improve the quality of the rating process and 
enhance transparency.90 CESR also stressed the need for a 
worldwide uniform approach to regulation of CRAs and 
encouraged close coordination between regulators in Europe and 
the United States.91 The EC’s own investigation generated the 
same conclusion, finding that the directives currently in place,92 
along with the self-regulation of CRAs based on the IOSCO 
Code of Conduct, sufficiently answered many of the EC’s 
concerns and no new legislative initiatives were needed.93 
After deciding that CRAs in the EU would remain self-
regulated for the time being, the EC and CESR developed a 
strategy for reviewing the implementation of the IOSCO Code of 
Conduct.94 CESR’s initial investigation, published in December 
2006, found that most CRA codes complied with the IOSCO 
Code of Conduct with two major exceptions: ancillary services 
and unsolicited ratings.95 CESR’s second report on CRA 
 
 90. Comm. of European Sec. Regulators [CESR], CESR’s Technical Advice to 
the European Commission on Possible Measures Concerning Credit Rating Agencies, 
at 50–51, CESR Doc. CESR/05-139b (Mar. 30, 2005), available at  
http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=3157 [hereinafter CESR, Technical Advice]. 
 91. See id. at 53. 
 92. The Market Abuse Directive applies to CRAs, in addition to other financial 
institutions, and mandates disclosure of conflicts of interest to clients and the fair 
presentation of investment recommendations. Council Directive 2003/6, On Insider 
Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), art. 6.5, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16–22. 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive applies only to those CRAs 
undertaking investment services, and imposes a number of rules on organizational 
structure and operating conditions, including disclosure of conflicts of interest. 
Council Directive 2004/39, On Markets in Financial Instruments, arts. 13–18, 2004 
O.J. (L 145) 14–17. 
 93. Communication from the Commission on Credit Rating Agencies, 2006 O.J. 
(C 59) 2–6. 
 94. CESR, CESR’s Report to the European Commission on the Compliance of 
Credit Rating Agencies with the IOSCO Code, ¶ 2, CESR Doc. CESR/06-545 (Dec. 
2006), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=4093. The process 
involved each CRA writing a letter explaining how it had complied with the IOSCO 
Code of Conduct and how it had deviated from it, an annual meeting between CESR 
and the CRAs to discuss implementation issues, and each CRA providing CESR with 
an explanation for any substantial incidents that occurred with a particular issuer 
in its market. Id. ¶ 3.  
 95. See id. ¶¶ 38–49. Many CRAs did not adopt provision 2.5 of the IOSCO 
Code of Conduct requiring CRAs to operationally and legally separate the credit 
rating business and CRA analysts from any other business that may create a conflict 
of interest because the CRAs do not consider “rating assessment services” ancillary 
services. Id. ¶ 42. Rating assessment services refer to situations where CRAs 
provide issuers with the likely impact various hypothetical events, such as a merger 
or differences in how the debt is structured, will have on a rating. Id. The CRAs also 
chose not to comply with provision 3.9 of the IOSCO Code of Conduct which requires 
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compliance with the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct, published 
in May 2008, found that some of the improvements suggested in 
the 2006 report had been implemented, but CESR’s expectations 
for improvement were only partially met.96 This second report 
also contained an analysis of the role of CRAs in structured 
finance.97 CESR found that while changes needed to be 
implemented in the areas of transparency, human resources, 
monitoring of ratings, and conflicts of interest,98 there was “no 
evidence that regulation of the credit rating industry would 
have had an effect on the issues which emerged with ratings” of 
U.S. RMBSs and CDOs, and consequently, CESR continued to 
support market-driven improvements.99 However, CESR did 
recommend that the EC form a CRA standard-setting and 
monitoring body to develop international standards for the 
credit rating industry.100 
The European Securities Market Expert Group (ESME)101 
also published a report on the role of CRAs in structured finance 
in 2006, reaching similar conclusions.102 Due to concerns about 
 
CRAs to disclose their policies and procedures regarding unsolicited ratings, 
whether the issuer participated in the rating process, and whether the rating was 
initiated at the request of the issuer because all the CRAs had different 
interpretations of what an unsolicited rating should be. Id. ¶ 46. 
 96. CESR, CESR’s Second Report to the European Commission on the 
Compliance of Credit Rating Agencies with the IOSCO Code and the Role of Credit 
Rating Agencies in Structured Finance, ¶ 225, CESR Doc. CESR/08-277 (May 2008), 
available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=5049. 
 97. See id. ¶¶ 90–206. 
 98. See id. For example, CESR recommended that CRAs clearly communicate 
the characteristics and limitations of the ratings of structured finance products, 
critical model assumptions including economic explanations for the assumptions, 
and the particular methodologies used in the ratings. See id. ¶¶ 121–146. CESR 
further believed the market would benefit from greater transparency with regard to 
failed or non-issued ratings because it would help alleviate market concerns over the 
integrity of the rating process in structured finance products. See id. ¶ 205. 
 99. Id. ¶ 7. 
 100. Id. ¶ 269. CESR urged the EC to immediately contact the relevant 
international authorities with the aim of setting up a single international group to 
ensure a global perspective on standard setting and monitoring. Id. ¶¶ 270–275. 
 101. The European Securities Market Expert Group was established in March 
2006 to provide legal, economic, and technical advice to the EC on the application of 
EU securities directives, as well as on issues of contemporary relevance in the EU 
securities markets including credit rating agencies and financial analysts. See 
Commission Decision 2006/288, art. 2, 2006 O.J. (L106) 1, 3 (EC). 
 102. EUROPEAN SEC. MKT. EXPERT GROUP [ESME], ROLE OF CREDIT RATING 
AGENCIES 8 (June 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/ 
docs/agencies/report_040608_en.pdf (“Given the global nature of the business of 
CRAs and the existing US law, we have doubts as to whether the development of a 
separate EU law would produce any particular benefits . . . . We think that 
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whether development of a separate EU law would produce any 
benefits, ESME advocated for an advisory group consisting of 
investors/users, issuers, banks, credit experts, and the SEC to 
provide CESR with an informed market perspective in order to 
enable it to review CRAs effectively.103 
The European Commission rejected CESR and ESME’s 
advice for continued self-regulation, believing stronger oversight 
was necessary in light of the economic crisis, and that CRAs 
should be subject to registration in the EU.104 In order to 
develop its own CRA regulation, the European Commission 
sought input on proposed regulatory options relating to CRA 
authorization and supervisory processes, in addition to a 
proposed directive.105 Many international securities regulators 
criticized the proposed regulation.106 The European 
Securitisation Forum107 and the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association108 raised numerous concerns over 
 
regulatory cooperation in this sphere is essential to avoid duplication of effort.”). 
 103. Id. at 22. ESME even stated that “full formal regulation may be 
counterproductive as it might be seen by users in the market place to imply a level 
of official endorsement of ratings which is neither justified nor feasible.” Id. 
 104. DG MARKT, Proposal for a Regulatory Framework for Credit Rating 
Agencies, at 2 (2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/ 
docs/securities_agencies/consultation-cra-framework_en.pdf. The European 
Commission explained why it believed self-regulation of CRAs was insufficient:  
Self-regulation based on voluntary compliance with the IOSCO code does 
not appear to offer an adequate, reliable solution to the structural 
deficiencies of the business. While the industry has come up with several 
schemes for self-regulation, most of these have not been robust and or 
stringent enough to cope with the severe problems and restore the 
confidence in the markets. Moreover, individual approaches by some of the 
credit rating agencies would not have the market-wide effect necessary to 
establish a level playing field across the EU and preferably worldwide.  
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit 
Rating Agencies, at 4, COM (2008) 704 final (Nov. 12, 2008). 
 105. See DG MARKT, supra note 104, at 1–33 (recommending various 
regulatory options and offering a proposed text of a directive/regulation on credit 
rating agencies). 
 106. See generally Letter from Rick Watson, Managing Dir., European 
Securitisation Forum, & Bertrand Huet-Delaherse, Managing Dir., European Legal 
& Regulatory Counsel, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkt. Ass’n, to DG MARKT (Sept. 5, 2008), 
available at http://www.sifma.org/europe/docs/Response-EU-CRA-Consultation.pdf. 
 107. The European Securitisation Forum (ESF), now known as AFME/ESF, 
addresses financial markets policy issues relating to securitization, works to build 
consensus within the industry, and seeks to eliminate inefficiencies in market 
regulation throughout Europe. See Association for Financial Markets in Europe, 
Welcome to AFME (Association for Financial Markets in Europe), 
http://afme.eu/dynamic.aspx?id=2294 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). 
 108. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) is an 
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the absence of global regulatory coordination,109 the 
extraterritorial impact of the proposed legislation,110 and the 
specificity of many rules which would not leave enough room for 
the CRAs to exercise appropriate business and professional 
judgment.111 CESR further reiterated the need for international 
coordination and raised additional concerns about potential 
anti-competition effects of the proposed regulation.112 
Despite these concerns, the EC’s impact assessment 
concluded that formal regulatory action was needed113 and the 
EC released its proposed regulation in December 2008.114 The 
proposed regulation had four overall objectives: (1) ensuring 
CRAs avoid conflicts of interest or at least manage them 
adequately; (2) improving the quality of the methodologies used 
by CRAs; (3) increasing transparency by setting disclosure 
obligations; and (4) ensuring an efficient registration and 
surveillance framework.115 
The proposal, as amended, was approved by the European 
Parliament on April 23, 2009116 and the European Council 
signed the regulation on September 16, 2009117 (EU CRA 
Regulation), signaling the first comprehensive regulation of 
CRAs in the EU. CRAs are required to apply the majority of the 
 
organization that represents the interests of participants in the global financial 
markets, including international securities firms, U.S. registered broker-dealers, 
and asset managers, on regulatory and legislative issues and initiatives. SIFMA, 
Welcome to SIFMA.org, http://www.sifma.org/about/about.html (last visited Feb. 16, 
2010). 
 109. Letter from Rick Watson & Bertrand Huet-Delaherse to DG MARKT, supra 
note 106, at 4–5. 
 110. Id. at 6. 
 111. Id. at 7. 
 112. CESR, CESR’s Response to the Consultation Document of the Commission 
Services on a Draft Proposal for a Directive/Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies, at 
2, CESR Doc. CESR/08-671 (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/ 
popup2.php?id=5222. 
 113. Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit Rating 
Agencies: Impact Assessment, at 48, COM (2008) 704 (Nov. 12, 2008) (“Self-
regulation has already been tested and has failed . . . . A legislative solution would 
be a proportionate measure to fulfill the objectives of providing for a uniform CRA 
regime across the EU.”). 
 114. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 104. 
 115. Id. at 4. 
 116. See Position of the European Parliament, COD (2009) 217 (Apr. 23, 2009), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// 
NONSGML+TC+P6-TC1-COD-2008-0217+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
 117. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16. 
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regulation by December 7, 2010.118 The regulation contains 
detailed provisions regarding conflicts of interest,119 rating 
analysts,120 methodologies,121 disclosure and presentation of 
credit ratings,122 transparency,123 registration,124 and 
cooperation with third countries.125 Most importantly, the scope 
of the regulation extends to CRAs located outside of the 
European Community, allowing the use of a credit rating issued 
by a CRA located in a third country only when the rating 
activities are either endorsed by a CRA located in the 
Community126 or comply with certification and equivalent 
requirements.127 CESR began developing aspects of the CRA 
registration process in late October 2009 and must issue 
guidance by May 2010.128 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT REGULATORY 
REGIMES  
International credit rating agencies are now subject to 
conflicting regulations in the United States and the European 
Union, and also may feel compelled to comply with the revised 
IOSCO Code of Conduct.129 This represents a dramatic shift 
from five years ago, when CRAs operated without heightened 
scrutiny from government regulators. Despite the many calls for 
international coordination,130 CRAs are now tasked with 
 
 118. See Id. art. 41. The provisions relating to endorsement shall apply 
beginning June 7, 2011. Id. 
 119. Id. art. 6. 
 120. Id. art. 7. 
 121. Id. art. 8. 
 122. Id. art. 10. 
 123. Id. art. 12. 
 124. Id. arts. 14–20. 
 125. Id. arts. 34–35. 
 126. Id. art. 4. 
 127. Id. art. 5. 
 128. See CESR, Consultation Paper: Guidance on Registration Process, 
Functioning of Colleges, Mediation Protocol, Information Set Out in Annex II, 
Information Set for the Application for Certification and for the Assessment of CRAs 
Systemic Importance, at 4, CESR Doc. CESR/09-955 (Oct. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=6142 [hereinafter CESR, Consultation 
Paper]. 
 129. The EU CRA Regulation states that CRAs should apply the IOSCO Code of 
Conduct on a voluntary basis. Council Regulation 1006/2009, supra note 16, para. 8. 
 130. See, e.g., CESR, Technical Advice, supra note 90, at 53; Council Regulation 
1060/2009, supra note 16, arts. 34–35; Letter from Rick Watson & Bertrand Huet-
Delaherse to DG MARKT, supra note 106, at 4–5. 
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implementing the complex rules and procedures promulgated in 
the various territories. This is a significant undertaking as the 
regulations permeate all aspects of the CRAs’ daily operations, 
and the CRAs are required to implement the stricter of any 
conflicting rules in order to ensure compliance with the laws if 
they wish to issue ratings for use in the EU or the United 
States.131 This section will dissect European Union regulation, 
comparing it to United States regulations as well as the revised 
IOSCO Code of Conduct. 
A. USE OF CREDIT RATINGS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
ENDORSEMENT AND CERTIFICATION 
The EU CRA Regulation applies to credit ratings132 that are 
publicly disclosed or distributed by subscription,133 not to 
private credit ratings produced pursuant to an individual order 
unintended for public disclosure or distribution by 
subscription.134 The EU CRA Regulation specifies that credit 
institutions, investment firms, insurance and reinsurance 
undertakings, collective investment schemes, and pension funds 
may only use credit ratings for regulatory purposes if they are 
issued by a credit rating agency135 established in the European 
Union and registered in accordance with the EU CRA 
Regulation.136 One example of “regulatory purpose” is including 
 
 131. CRAs operating in the U.S. are subject to SEC regulations stemming from 
the Rating Agency Act of 2006 while CRAs wishing to issue ratings for use in the 
European Union would be subject to a different set of regulations in the EU CRA 
Regulation. See Amadou N.R. Sy, The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies 
and Rated Markets 24-26 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/129, 
2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09129.pdf. 
 132. “Credit rating” is defined as “an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of 
an entity, a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other 
financial instrument, or of an issuer of such a debt or financial obligation, debt 
security, preferred share or other financial instrument, issued using an established 
and defined ranking system of rating categories.” Council Regulation 1060/2009, 
supra note 16, art. 3(1)(a). A credit rating does not include recommendations within 
the meaning of Article 1(3) of Directive 2003/125/EC, investment research or other 
forms of general recommendation such as “buy,” “sell,” or “hold,” or opinions about 
the value of a financial instrument or financial obligation. Id. art. 3(2). 
 133. Id. art. 2(1). 
 134. Id. art. 2(2)(a). The EU CRA Regulation also does not apply to credit scores, 
credit scoring systems, credit ratings produced by export credit agencies, and credit 
ratings produced by central banks. See id. art. 2(2)(b)–(d). 
 135. A “credit rating agency” is defined as “a legal person whose occupation 
includes the issuing of credit ratings on a professional basis.” Id. art. 3(1)(b). 
 136. Id. art. 4(1). A “credit institution” is “an undertaking whose business is to 
receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its 
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a reference to a credit rating in a prospectus for a public offering 
or for being listed on an exchange in the EU.137 The regulation 
does not completely ban the listed institutions from using 
ratings of non-EU CRAs for regulatory purposes. Instead, if an 
institution wishes to utilize the credit rating issued by a CRA 
located outside of the Community for a regulatory purpose, the 
rating must be deemed eligible either through endorsement or 
certification.138 
A CRA located in the EU and registered pursuant to the EU 
CRA Regulation may endorse the rating of a non-EU CRA only 
if numerous conditions are satisfied. First, the endorsing EU 
CRA and the non-EU CRA must belong to the same group.139 
This means that any CRA based outside of the Community 
which is considered systemically important, or any CRA that 
wishes to qualify through endorsement rather than certification, 
must establish a subsidiary within the Community.140 “Systemic 
importance” is not defined in the regulation, but presumably 
implies the largest CRAs based in the United States, Japan, and 
Canada.141 Second, the non-EU CRA must be authorized or 
registered, and subject to supervision in that third country.142 
Finally, the non-EU CRA must fulfill requirements relating to 
conflicts of interest, rating analysts, methodologies, outsourcing, 
disclosure, and transparency which are at least as stringent as 
those in the EU CRA Regulation.143 While the term “at least as 
stringent” is not defined in the EU CRA Regulation, a CRA 
merely complying with the U.S. Rating Agency Act and the 
revised IOSCO Code of Conduct likely would not meet this 
standard, as this Section will make apparent. 
The endorsing EU CRA must also meet numerous 
 
own account.” Directive 2006/48, art. 4(1), 2006 O.J. (L 177) (EC). A “regulatory 
purpose” is defined as “the use of credit ratings for the specific purpose of complying 
with Community law, as implemented by the national legislation of the Member 
States.” Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 3(1)(g). 
 137. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 2(1). 
 138. See id. art. 4(3)–5. 
 139. Id. art. 4(3)(a). A “group of credit rating agencies” means a parent company 
and its subsidiaries and/or affiliated companies, including those credit rating 
agencies established in third countries. Id. art. 3(1)(m). 
 140. See id. para. 13.  
 141. See CESR, Call for Evidence: Fact Finding Exercise of the Use in the 
European Union of Ratings Issued by Third Country CRAs, CESR Doc. CESR/09-681 
(July 3, 2009), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=5785 [hereinafter 
CESR, Call for Evidence]. 
 142. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 4(3)(f). 
 143. See id. art. 4(3)(b). 
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obligations. The EU CRA must verify that the requirements 
outlined in the EU CRA Regulation are being met by the non-
EU CRA,144 demonstrate that there is an objective reason for 
the rating to be done in a third country,145 and make 
information available to the EU regulator so the regulator can 
supervise the non-EU CRA’s compliance with the EU CRA 
Regulation.146 The effect of these provisions is to ensure that 
any systemically important CRA based outside of the 
Community is subject to the same regulations and supervision 
as any CRA located in the EU, thereby forcing all non-EU CRAs 
to comply with the strict provisions outlined in the EU CRA 
Regulation. 
Additionally, in order to qualify for endorsement, the non-
EU CRA must rely on both EU and third-country regulators to 
fulfill their obligations under the regulation.147 The non-EU 
regulator must either prevent public authorities of the third 
country from interfering with the content of CRA methodologies 
and ratings,148 or establish a supervisory framework equivalent 
to the EU CRA Regulation.149 Meanwhile, the EU regulator of 
the “Home Member State” is responsible for assessing and 
monitoring the compliance of the non-EU CRA with the 
regulations.150 Both regulatory regimes are responsible for 
entering into an appropriate cooperation agreement covering 
the exchange of information, as well as procedures concerning 
the coordination of supervisory activities.151 
Alternatively, credit ratings issued by a CRA located 
outside of the European Community may be used if the non-EU 
CRA complies with the certification process outlined in the EU 
CRA Regulation.152 Like the endorsement requirements, a non-
EU CRA wishing to qualify through the certification process 
must be authorized or registered in and subject to supervision in 
that third country,153 and the EU and non-EU regulators must 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. art. 4(3)(e). 
 146. Id. art. 4(3)(d). 
 147. See id. art. 4(3). 
 148. Id. art. 4(3)(g). 
 149. Id. art. 4(6). 
 150. Id. art. 4(3)(c). “Home Member State” is defined as the “Member State in 
which the credit rating agency has its registered office.” Id. art. 3(1)(c). 
 151. Id. art. 4(3)(h). 
 152. See id. art. 5(1). 
 153. Id. art. 5(1)(a). 
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enter into a cooperation agreement.154 The European 
Commission must then adopt an equivalence decision 
recognizing that the legal and supervisory framework of that 
third country is equivalent to the EU CRA Regulation.155 
Thereafter, the non-EU CRA must apply for certification under 
the same registration process applied to CRAs located in the 
European Community.156 Only CRAs deemed not to be “of 
systemic importance to the financial stability or integrity of the 
financial markets of one or more Member States” will be allowed 
to qualify through certification.157 CESR considers the matter of 
determining systemic importance an issue for competent 
authorities of all member states, and has proposed that each 
member state tell CESR what activities it considers to be of 
systemic importance in its respective jurisdiction.158 
CESR has issued some guidance on its intended approach 
for determining endorsement and certification.159 CESR does 
not plan on making authorities check every rating that is going 
to be endorsed, but indicated that CRAs should be able to prove 
at any time that all the endorsements issued comply with the 
requirements of the EU CRA Regulation.160 CESR also stated 
that the EU CRA must clearly identify an endorsed rating as 
such.161 If a CRA seeks to have its ratings qualify for use in the 
EU via certification, CESR only requires one submission for the 
entire group of related CRAs.162 Once granted, the certification 
would be effective for the entire territory of the European 
Community.163 
Both the certification and endorsement provisions could 
have considerable extraterritorial implications because the EU 
CRA Regulation is imposed on CRAs regardless of where they 
are domiciled.164 Some CRAs have argued that the EU CRA 
 
 154. Id. art. 5(1)(c). 
 155. Id. art. 5(1)(b). 
 156. See id. art. 5(2). 
 157. See id. art. 5(1)(d). 
 158. See CESR, Consultation Paper, supra note 128, ¶ 84. 
 159. See id. ¶¶ 10–274 (seeking comment on the proposed CESR guidance). 
 160. See id. ¶ 70. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. ¶ 77. 
 163. Id. ¶ 79. 
 164. See Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkt. Ass’n [SIFMA], Global Advocacy Issues 8 
(May 29, 2009) (discussion slides available at http://www.prmia.org/Chapter_Pages/ 
Data/Files/3226_3508_Global%20Advocacy%20Issues._other1.pdf); see also JOINT 
RESPONSE BY HM TREASURY, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY (FSA), AND THE 
BANK OF ENGLAND TO THE COMMISSION CONSULTATION ON: A DRAFT 
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Regulation captures the entirety of the global credit ratings 
business because all ratings issued are available to all investors, 
regardless of where they are based, and any institution that is 
subject to EU regulation may decide to use its ratings for 
regulatory purposes.165 The extraterritorial reach of the 
regulation turns on whether a particular jurisdiction’s 
regulatory regime is considered “at least as stringent” as the EU 
CRA Regulation. CESR argues that there is no objective reason 
to set different requirements for non-EU CRAs depending on the 
mechanism used, so the quality requirements for credit ratings 
endorsed and credit ratings issued by a certified CRA should not 
be different.166 Thus, a decision by the European Commission 
recognizing the equivalence of a third country’s legal and 
supervisory framework would be sufficient for an endorsing EU 
CRA to demonstrate that the non-EU CRA fulfils requirements 
at least as stringent as those set out in the EU CRA 
Regulation.167 
In the past, equivalency focused more on whether the 
regulatory regime broadly achieved equivalent outcomes. For 
example, in 2008 the EU deemed the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles of the United States, Canada, and Japan 
equivalent to its International Financial Reporting Standards, 
despite some major differences.168 Due to the subprime 
mortgage crisis, the EU may be in a position to assert regulatory 
leadership, causing equivalency determinations for CRAs to be 
 
DIRECTIVE/REGULATION ON THE AUTHORISATION, OPERATION AND SUPERVISION OF 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (CRAS) AND POLICY OPTIONS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF 
EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON CREDIT RATINGS 2 (Sept. 5, 2008), http://circa.europa.eu/ 
Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/credit_agencies/ 
authorities/uk_ministrypdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d [hereinafter HM TREASURY]; Letter from 
Jonathan Taylor, Chairman, Int’l Council of Sec. Ass’ns [ICSA], & Marilyn Skiles, 
Sec’y Gen., ICSA, to DG MARKT 2 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/ 
financial_services/credit_agencies/citizens/international_associatio/_EN_1.0_&a=d; 
Letter from Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice President, Standard and Poor’s 
Ratings Servs., to DG MARKT 3 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/
credit_agencies/citizens/standard_poorspdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d. 
 165. See, e.g., Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 3, 
11. 
 166. See CESR, Consultation Paper, supra note 128, ¶¶ 88, 90–91. 
 167. See id. ¶ 91. 
 168. See Council Directive 2008/961, Commission Decision of 12 December 2008 
on the Use By Third Countries’ Issuers of Securities of Certain Third Country’s 
National Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards to 
Prepare Their Consolidated Financial Statements, 2008 O.J. (L 340) 112 (EC). 
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based on more detailed evaluations involving a line-by-line 
comparison of rules and regulations. “The European 
Commission service’s informal view communicated to CESR 
clearly states their understanding that [the endorsement 
provisions] should be interpreted as requiring local legal and 
regulatory system[s] to impose requirements as stringent as 
those found” in the EU CRA Regulation.169 Thus, the EU is 
essentially hinging non-EU CRAs’ abilities to qualify for 
endorsement or certification on the regulatory authorities 
located in their home countries. If a non-EU regulator wishes to 
allow CRAs domiciled within its jurisdiction the right to issue 
ratings for use in the EU, but does not already have a 
regulatory regime at least as stringent as the EU’s, it may have 
to comply with the EU CRA Regulation, including entering into 
cooperation agreements with EU regulators.170 Consequently, 
non-EU regulators may be forced to abide by provisions they did 
not adopt.171 
The equivalency determination also raises practical 
implementation questions about what happens if non-EU 
regulators are unable to fulfill their obligations or choose not to 
satisfy the necessary requirements.172 It seems unfair to bar the 
use of credit ratings in the EU if they are issued by non-EU 
CRAs who are otherwise in compliance with all provisions in the 
EU CRA Regulation. However, the EU CRA Regulation does not 
provide any exceptions for such a situation, reasoning that: 
[T]hird-country CRAs need to be subject to supervision and possible 
enforcement by the relevant authority of the third-country for 
endorsement to be effective. . . . If the requirements for endorsement 
could be established on a voluntary basis the risk of noncompliance by 
the third-country CRA would be significantly higher.173 
The EU CRA Regulation provides an eighteen month 
transition period until June 7, 2011 for the endorsement 
provisions.174 During that time, the endorsing CRA will confirm 
to EU authorities that the non-EU CRA has met the 
 
 169. CESR, Consultation Paper, supra note 128, ¶ 93. 
 170. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 5. The EU CRA 
Regulation does, however, provide for limited exceptions. Id. art. 5(4). 
 171. See supra text accompanying note 169. 
 172. See M. Madelain & N. Phipps, Moody’s Investor Services, Presentation to 
the IOSCO Standing Committee: Regulation of CRAs: Global Perspective 6, 12–23 
(July 15, 2009) (discussion slides on file with author). 
 173. CESR, Consultation Paper, supra note 128, ¶¶ 94–95. 
 174. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 41. 
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requirements on a self-imposed basis if there was no equivalent 
local regulatory regime.175 After that date, however, the CRAs 
without an exemption and whose home regulatory regimes are 
not deemed equivalent to or as stringent as the EU CRA 
Regulation have to establish and register a subsidiary within 
the European Community and conduct all rating activities for 
use in the EU through that entity.176 
The three largest CRAs (Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch) are 
based in the United States, and no CRA based in the EU is a 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) 
in the United States.177 In the event that no CRA is exempted 
and no regulatory regimes are deemed equivalent to, or at least 
as stringent as the EU CRA Regulation, only those ratings 
developed entirely within the EU would be eligible for 
regulatory purposes.178 This could hinder the flow of capital 
between Europe and non-EU jurisdictions, thus lessening 
European investment opportunities.179 It could also impact the 
ability of foreign governments or companies to raise capital in 
the EU.180 Finally, if the EU-based CRAs choose not to, or are 
unable to, rate securities outside of the EU, the EU financial 
institutions would not be able to invest in non-EU debt 
securities.181 Even if the smaller EU CRAs did rate debt outside 
of the EU, their ratings may not be viewed as being of sufficient 
quality, and their regulatory use by EU financial firms may 
raise concerns among other market participants.182 
The EU CRA Regulation’s certification requirement could 
also have anti-competitive effects, serving as a barrier to entry 
into the EU market.183 While many of the U.S. based CRAs have 
 
 175. CESR, Consultation Paper, supra note 128, ¶ 100. 
 176. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 5. 
 177. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Spotlight on Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ 
ratingagency.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2010). 
 178. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 5. 
 179. See Letter from Yasuhiro Harada, Chairman and Co-Chief Executive 
Officer, Rating and Investment Information, Inc., to Jörgen Holmquist, Dir. Gen., 
Internal Mkt. and Servs., European Comm’n 4 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/
credit_agencies/citizens/ri_japanpdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d. 
 180. SIFMA, supra note 164, at 8. 
 181. See supra Part II.A. 
 182. See supra Part II.A. 
 183. See generally Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra 
note 179, at 4 (claiming that Article 3 could compel non-Community-based CRAs to 
cease operations in the European Community); Letter from Takefumi Emori, 
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subsidiaries in the EU, two of the largest CRAs in Asia, Rating 
and Investment Information, Inc. and Japan Credit Rating 
Agency, Ltd., do not currently have subsidiaries in the EU.184 
Rating and Investment Information, Inc. primarily assigns 
ratings on bonds issued in Japan, but it also assigns ratings to 
bonds issued in the European Community’s markets, including 
finance subsidiaries of Japanese corporations, EU sovereign 
governments, and EU issuers.185 Similarly, Japan Credit Rating 
Agency, Ltd. primarily rates corporations and financial 
institutions in Japan, but those ratings can be utilized by 
banking institutions in the EC for risk weight assessment.186 
While the volume of rating activities each CRA performs in the 
EU is relatively small, they are both large CRAs likely to be 
deemed systemically important, and thus would not be able to 
use the certification procedure.187 Instead, these CRAs would 
have the burden of establishing EU-based subsidiaries to issue 
these ratings.188 Such an action may be deemed too costly in 
relation to the amount of revenue such rating activities would 
generate, causing CRAs like Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. 
or Rating and Investment Information, Inc. to withdraw from 
the Community altogether.189 Even for entities not found to be 
systemically important, many jurisdictions’ regulations likely 
will not be deemed equivalent because the EU CRA Regulation 
extends beyond the IOSCO Code of Conduct and ratings issued 
by these unqualified CRAs would be disbarred, thereby limiting 
competition within the EU.190 
The European Commission is currently seeking technical 
 
Managing Dir., Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd., to the European Comm’n 2 (Sept. 
5, 2008), available at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/ 
library?l=/financial_services/credit_agencies/citizens/jcr_japanpdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d 
(noting that the requirement of having a subsidiary or branch in the Community 
could prevent some non-Community-based CRAs from operating in the Community 
completely). 
 184. See Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at 
3; Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, at 2. 
 185. Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at 3. 
 186. Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, at 2 
(providing the example of EC banking institutions using the ratings for risk weight 
assessment under Basel II). 
 187. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
 188. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
 189. See supra text accompanying note 140; see also Letter from Yasuhiro 
Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at 4. 
 190. See Edmund Parker & Miles Bake, Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in 
Europe, 24 BUTTERWORTHS J. OF INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 401, 402 (2009). 
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advice from CESR regarding whether the regulatory 
frameworks in the United States, Japan, and Canada are 
equivalent, as well as whether additional jurisdictions should be 
assessed.191 The outcome of CESR’s investigation should provide 
additional insight into the rigidity of the “equivalence” 
requirement, and the extent to which the EU CRA Regulation 
will have anti-competitive or extraterritorial effects. 
B. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
The IOSCO Code of Conduct, the U.S. Rating Agency Act, 
and the EU CRA Regulation all include provisions covering 
conflicts of interest, but the specificity and scope of the 
provisions vary greatly, creating another area of potential 
conflict. The EU CRA Regulation provides detailed 
requirements relating to the organizational structure and 
corporate governance of CRAs as a way to avoid conflicts of 
interest.192 For example, CRAs must establish administrative or 
supervisory boards to ensure that credit rating activities are 
independent, properly identify conflicts of interest, and 
maintain agency compliance with the regulation 
requirements.193 At least one-third of the board’s members, but 
no less than two members, must be independent and uninvolved 
in credit rating activities.194 At least one of these independent 
members and one other member of the board are required to 
have “in-depth knowledge and experience at a senior level of the 
markets in structured finance instruments” if the CRA issues 
credit ratings of structured finance instruments.195 The 
regulation also stipulates requirements regarding the 
compensation, term length, dismissal, and financial expertise of 
the independent members.196 Finally, the independent members 
are given the task of monitoring, among other things, the 
 
 191. See Letter from Jörgen Holmquist, Dir. Gen., Internal Mkt. and Servs., 
European Comm’n, to Eddy Wymeersh, Chairman, CESR (June 12, 2009), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/cesr/cesr_mandat20090612_en.pdf. 
 192. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § A. 
 193. Id. annex I, § A(1). 
 194. Id. annex I, § A(2). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. The regulation requires independent members’ compensation to be 
separate from the business performance of the CRA to ensure independence of their 
judgment. Id. It also provides that independent members cannot serve more than a 
five-year non-renewable term. Id. Dismissal of an independent board member is only 
allowed in the case of misconduct or professional underperformance. Id. 
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development of the methodologies used by the CRA and the 
effectiveness of internal controls.197 
Many CRAs expressed concern about the ability of the EU 
to regulate their corporate governance standards, especially 
given the fact that most CRAs are headquartered outside of the 
EU and therefore subject to separate corporate governance 
standards.198 For example, Moody’s is listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and therefore complies with NYSE’s 
Corporate Governance Listing Standards, which differ from the 
standards outlined in the EU CRA Regulation.199 Similarly, 
under Japanese law, shareholders have the right to elect the 
executive and non-executive members of the board of directors 
at shareholder meetings.200 Japanese shareholders may find it 
excessively intrusive, and a violation of their rights, to be forced 
to limit the terms of office of the non-executive members of the 
board in order to comply with the EU CRA Regulation.201 A.M. 
Best, another U.S.-based rating agency, argued that it is under 
no obligation to have independent board members as a privately 
held company headquartered in the United States.202 The 
extraterritorial reach of these provisions could be extreme if 
they obligate non-EU CRAs to abandon their current corporate 
governance arrangements, which comply with the laws in their 
respective jurisdictions, and non-EU regulators are forced to 
change their corporate governance standards in order for CRAs 
based in their jurisdictions to be deemed equivalent in the EU. 
It is also unclear how the requirement to have independent 
members on an administrative or supervisory board would apply 
within a group structure.203 Standard and Poor’s expressed 
concern that a subsidiary will frequently not have any 
 
 197. Id. annex I, § A(2)(a), (b). 
 198. See Letter from Michel Madelain, Chief Operating Officer, Moody’s 
Investors Serv., to Maria Valentza, Head of the Sec. Unit, DG MARKT 2–6 (Sept. 5, 
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 202. Letter from Larry G. Mayewski, Executive Vice President and Chief Rating 
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 203. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 19. 
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independent board members, but the regulation does not clarify 
if the board of the parent company in those circumstances is to 
be treated as the administrative or supervisory board or if both 
the parent and the subsidiary will be required to appoint non-
executive directors.204 This requirement places particular 
pressure on systemically important CRAs because they must 
establish subsidiaries in the EU to endorse the ratings of their 
non-EU based affiliates.205 This means they could potentially 
have more than one administrative or supervisory board with 
each required to comply with the corporate governance 
standards outlined in the EU CRA Regulation.206 
The independent board member requirements also raise a 
number of other concerns. First, they could have “the 
unintended consequence of inhibiting credit rating agent 
competition in the EU.”207 Additionally, the regulations 
“inappropriately weight the knowledge base of CRA’s non-
executive board members toward the structured finance 
industry.”208 Requiring the independent members to monitor the 
methodologies, quality control systems, and compliance 
processes used by the CRA could make it hard for CRAs to find 
and retain independent board members since most non-
executive directors would be reluctant to assume such 
responsibility.209 Assigning these obligations to independent 
board members may even erode their objectivity and 
independence by implicating them in day-to-day decision 
making.210 The extensive regulation of independent board 
 
 204. Id. 
 205. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
 206. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
 207. Letter from Larry G. Mayewski to European Comm’n, supra note 202, at 3. 
 208. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 5. 
 209. Id. at 6. 
 210. Id. at 4. “[N]on-executive or independent directors are seen as being 
valuable precisely because they will bring a different perspective to the deliberations 
of the Board. It is generally the role of non-executive or independent directors ‘to 
exercise objective independent judgment on corporate affairs.’” Letter from Vickie A. 
Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 18–19 (citing Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 63 
(2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf). “Therefore, 
the expectation, in many jurisdictions at least, is that the non-executives’ role is not 
to act as experts in order to monitor the work of the executives, officers, and 
employees of the group . . . .” Id. at 19. It seems imprudent to require such a central 
monitoring function to be handed over to independent members “with no long-term 
stake in the reputation of the CRA.” Letter from Stephen W. Joynt, President and 
Chief Executive Officer, Fitch Ratings, to DG MARKT 6 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/ 
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members is a significant change from the self-regulatory regime 
under which CRAs previously operated, and is considerably 
more prescriptive than the IOSCO Code of Conduct and the U.S. 
Rating Agency Act.211 
The EU CRA Regulation also contains specific provisions 
aimed at rating analysts that are inconsistent with the IOSCO 
Code of Conduct and the U.S. Rating Agency Act. The regulation 
requires CRAs to establish gradual rotation mechanisms so that 
rating analysts cannot be involved in rating activities related to 
the same entity or its related third parties for more than five 
years.212 This could negatively impact the quality of ratings and 
will be extremely costly and burdensome to implement.213 The 
quality of ratings in smaller, more concentrated sectors, such as 
structured finance securities, is especially at risk as the 
requirement limits analyst and committee experience by forcing 
board members to rotate.214 
This rule is aimed at concerns that the excessive familiarity 
of an analyst and a rated enterprise creates conflicts of interest 
that could influence the credit ratings issued.215 However, credit 
rating decisions are made by ratings committees, not single 
analysts, and these ratings committees consist of analysts from 
different teams and different sectors.216 Thus, it is arguably 
 
Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/credit_agencies/ 
citizens/fitchpdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d. 
 211. Neither the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct or the U.S. Rating Agency Act 
contain any provisions relating to the corporate governance of CRAs. 
 212. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 7(4); see also id. annex I, 
§ C(8). Lead analysts must rotate every four years and approvers must rotate every 
seven years. Id. 
 213. See Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 21–
22 (stating that Moody’s might have to recruit solely in order to be able to rotate 
analysts); see also Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 
183, at 2; HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 18; Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG 
MARKT, supra note 164, at 34. 
 214. CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, REPORT OF THE CEPS-ECMI 
JOINT WORKSHOP ON “THE REFORM OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES” 3 (2008), 
http://www.eurocapitalmarkets.org/files/Report_CRAMeeting_19Nov08%20FinalII.pdf; 
see also Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, at 2 
(stating that the requirement will likely impede the analysts’ progress in gaining 
knowledge and expertise about a particular business sector because some business 
sectors are comprised of only a few unaffiliated enterprises); HM TREASURY, supra 
note 164, at 18; Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 34. 
 215. See Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, 
at 2–3. 
 216. See Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 21; 
see also Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, at 2. 
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unnecessary to rotate analysts.217 Rather than mitigating 
potential conflicts of interest, the effect of requiring analyst 
rotation could be decreased competition if small or medium-
sized CRAs are unable to comply with this provision.218 
The EU CRA Regulation also places employment 
restrictions on analysts, prohibiting any rating analyst or 
employee of a CRA from taking a key management position with 
an entity he or she rated, or its related third party, within six 
months of the credit rating.219 “Key management position” is not 
defined in the regulation, making it unclear exactly what 
positions analysts would be barred from taking.220 CRAs based 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan all 
expressed concerns about the legality and enforceability of this 
employment restriction in their respective jurisdictions.221 
Furthermore, this requirement could make it difficult for CRAs 
to compete for talented people who may prefer to work for an 
employer that does not restrict their career advancement 
opportunities.222 Finally, the employment restriction provision, 
like the analyst rotation requirement, misunderstands the role 
of individuals in the rating process; an individual cannot make 
or break ratings for particular entities which they may later 
join.223 
Under the EU CRA Regulation, credit rating agencies are 
additionally tasked with ensuring that its rating analysts and 
other employees directly involved in credit rating activities have 
“appropriate knowledge and experience for the duties 
assigned.”224 This contrasts with the revised IOSCO Code of 
 
 217. See Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, 
at 2; see also Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at 
10 (stating that the same goal can be achieved with rating committees where 
analysts in charge of the rated entity do not have voting rights at the rating 
committee). 
 218. See Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at 
10 (stating that it may be impossible for some smaller CRAs to comply with this due 
to limited management resources); Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European 
Comm’n, supra note 183, at 2 (arguing that the provision creates a competitive 
disadvantage for small to medium-sized CRAs).  
 219. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § C(7). 
 220. See Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 41. 
 221. See Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at 
18; HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 23; Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria 
Valentza, supra note 198, at 5. 
 222. Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at 10; 
see also Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 41. 
 223. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 42. 
 224. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 7(1). 
 432 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 19:2 
 
Conduct, which requires CRAs to “use people who, individually 
or collectively (particularly where rating committees are used) 
have appropriate knowledge and experience.”225 While there is 
only a slight difference between the two provisions, the missing 
phrase “or collectively” in the EU CRA Regulation could provide 
regulators a platform from which to question the opinions of 
individual analysts.226 
In another attempt to reduce conflicts of interest, the EU 
CRA Regulation prohibits CRAs from providing “consultancy or 
advisory services to the rated entity or a related third party 
regarding the corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities or 
activities of that rated entity or related third party.”227 The 
regulation, however, does not explicitly prohibit ancillary 
services such as market forecasts, estimates of economic trends, 
and pricing analysis so long as providing these ancillary services 
does not create conflicts of interest.228 These provisions are 
similar to those in the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct which 
suggests CRAs should separate credit rating business from 
other business of the agency, including consulting.229 While 
these requirements may decrease potential conflicts of interest, 
there are no similar requirements for consultancy or advisory 
services in the U.S. Rating Agency Act. 230 
Despite these differences, there are some similarities 
between the three regulations. Most importantly, rating 
analysts or approvers are prohibited from making proposals or 
recommendations regarding the design of structured finance 
instruments on which the CRA is expected to issue a credit 
rating.231 The impact this regulation will have on CRAs remains 
to be seen, but it is likely to have a significant effect on the 
iterative process arrangers and CRAs typically employ, and it 
will likely make arrangers’ tasks more difficult if they cannot 
receive recommendations as to what changes are necessary to 
achieve a particular rating.232 The Securities Industry and 
 
 225. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.4. 
 226. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 19. 
 227. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § B(4). 
 228. Id. annex I, § B(4). 
 229. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.5. 
 230. See generally Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
291, § 4, 120 Stat. 1327 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2)). 
 231. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § B(5), with 
SEC NRSRO Conflicts of Interest Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(5) (2009) (effective 
Feb. 1, 2010), and IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.14-1. 
 232. See MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, THE EU RATING AGENCY REGULATION 5 
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Financial Markets Association task force noted that it believes 
the iterative process is a core service, not an advisory function, 
and therefore would not be included within these provisions.233 
All three regulations contain general provisions requiring 
CRAs to eliminate, manage, and disclose any conflicts of interest 
of employees.234 Each regulation specifically prohibits analysts 
or approvers from participating in fee negotiations with the 
rated entity,235 from receiving money, gifts, or favors from 
anyone which the CRA does business with,236 and from owning 
financial instruments of the rated entity, a related entity, or an 
entity with which they have a business relationship.237 Finally, 
the regulations require that the CRAs designate a compliance 
officer to ensure compliance with the CRA’s policies and 
procedures.238 While these provisions are relatively the same 
 
(2009), http://www.jdsupra.com/post/fileServer.aspx?fName=065cb65e-0cd7-4915-
819b-39584771aa53.pdf. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § B(1), 
(requiring CRAs to “identify, eliminate or manage and disclose . . . conflicts of 
interest” but not requiring written protocols for such measures), with 17 C.F.R. § 
240.17g-5(a) (prohibiting conflicts of interests unless the CRA discloses such conflict 
and is “enforcing written policies and procedures to address and manage conflicts of 
interest”), and IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.6 (advising 
CRA’s to “adopt written internal procedures and mechanisms to (1) identify, and (2) 
eliminate, or manage and disclose” conflicts of interest). 
 235. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 7(2), (specifying 
the scope of the prohibited entity to include “any person directly or indirectly linked 
to the rated entity by control”), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(6) (prohibiting analysts 
from participating in negotiations, discussions, or arrangements of fee-payments in 
general), and IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.12 (prohibiting 
analysts from involvement in fee-arrangements with entities they rate). 
 236. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16 annex I, § C(4) 
(prohibiting analysts from receiving any gifts, money, or favors with anyone doing 
business with the CRA), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(7) (prohibiting analysts from 
receiving gifts or entertainment from someone associated with the rated entity, over  
an aggregate value of twenty-five dollars), and IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, 
supra note 71, § 2.15 (prohibiting analysts from receiving gifts or cash “exceeding a 
minimal monetary value” from anyone doing business with the CRA). 
 237. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(2) (prohibiting analysts from having 
direct ownership in the securities or other interests of the rated entity), with Council 
Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § C(2)(a)–(c) (prohibiting interest in 
rated entities which may cause a general perception of a conflict of interest), and 
IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.13(a)–(e) (recommending 
that analysts with any relationship to the rated entity not participate in the rating). 
 238. Compare Credit Rating Reform Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(j) (2006) 
(requiring CRAs to designate a conflicts of interest compliance officer without 
specifying compensation restrictions), with Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra 
note 16, annex I, § A(5)–(7) (requiring a separate compensation structure for 
compliance officers to ensure independent judgments), and IOSCO, REVISED CODE 
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between the EU CRA Regulation, the revised IOSCO Code of 
Conduct, and the U.S. Rating Agency Act, there are slight 
nuances in many of the rules that could create a logistical 
nightmare for CRAs determining what conflicts of interest 
requirements to implement and enforce.239 
C. METHODOLOGIES AND QUALITY OF CREDIT RATINGS  
While all three regulatory regimes address the procedures 
and methodologies CRAs use to formulate credit ratings, only 
the EU CRA Regulation offers explicit details. The U.S. Rating 
Agency Act prohibits U.S. regulators at either the state or 
federal level from “regulat[ing] the substance of credit ratings or 
the procedures and methodologies by which any nationally 
recognized statistical rating organization determines credit 
ratings.”240 As a result, other than a few disclosure 
requirements necessary for CRAs to register as NRSROs,241 the 
U.S. rules and regulations governing NRSROs provide no 
requirements related to methodologies or rating procedures. The 
EU CRA Regulation does not contain a similar prohibition in 
the primary text of the regulation, but the recitals do state that 
the competent authorities and member states should not 
interfere in “relation to the substance of credit ratings and the 
methodologies by which a credit rating agency determines credit 
ratings.”242 Many CRAs have expressed concern, however, that 
this is insufficient to protect their independence.243 The CRAs’ 
fear of intrusion in the content of their rating opinions from EU 
regulators stems from two factors. First, the provisions in the 
EU CRA Regulation are broad enough to give regulators a wide 
range to interfere with the quality of ratings and methodologies, 
the information used to support ratings, and the judgment and 
 
OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.15. 
 239. See supra Part II.B. 
 240. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4, 120 
Stat. 1327 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2)). 
 241. See id. (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii)). 
 242. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, para. 58. 
 243. See Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at 
2 (recognizing that CRAs must have independence in formulating the content of 
their ratings); Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at i 
(arguing for regulatory flexibility so as to allow CRAs the freedom to develop 
methodologies and policies); Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra 
note 164, at 4 (stating that various regulatory provisions are too burdensome to 
ensure independent and objective ratings). 
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experience of CRA analysts and personnel.244 Second, 
governments are the largest issuers of debt globally which could 
heighten sensitivities to potential ratings actions.245 As a result, 
EU regulators could feel pressured into preventing CRAs from 
taking certain rating actions.246 This particular concern is 
heightened by the fact that the EU CRA Regulation allows for 
regulators of the home member states to impose sanctions on 
CRAs.247 Therefore, the manner in which a CRA can implement 
its methodologies and assess the quality of credit ratings is 
critical to ensuring CRA independence. 
The EU CRA Regulation directs CRAs to only use 
“methodologies that are rigorous, systematic, continuous and 
subject to validation based on historical experience, including 
back-testing.”248 Comparatively, the IOSCO Code of Conduct 
recommends that, where possible, ratings methods should be 
subject to some form of objective validation based on historical 
experience.249 The EU CRA Regulation thus creates a 
requirement that CRAs validate their methodologies based on 
historical experience, rather than following the recommendation 
in the IOSCO Code of Conduct. This could result in CRAs being 
discouraged from developing new methods.250 The EU CRA 
Regulation also inserts the additional requirement that the 
methodologies be “continuous,” a description not included in the 
IOSCO Code of Conduct.251 CRAs often use both quantitative 
and qualitative inputs in rating decisions, with analysts 
evaluating the relative importance of different inputs, and it is 
unclear if these are considered “continuous” or “systematic.”252 
Moreover, this provision could justify regulatory interference in 
the methods, models, and independent rating decisions of CRAs 
 
 244. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 4. 
 245. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 1. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 24(1)(a)–(c), (f) (allowing 
regulators to withdraw the registration of a CRA, temporarily prohibit a CRA from 
issuing a credit rating, prevent the Community from using the CRA’s credit rating, 
or refer matters for criminal prosecution). 
 248. Id. art. 8(3). 
 249. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.2. 
 250. See Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at 
8 (arguing in opposition to article 12(4) of the Commission’s proposed regulation 
(now article 8(3) of the current regulation) by stating that a standard regulatory 
review of rating methodologies is not suited to serve the development of new 
criteria). 
 251. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 8(3). 
 252. See HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 18. 
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because it is not clear that independent judgment is 
protected.253 
With regard to the methodologies used in relation to 
structured finance products, the EU CRA Regulation provides: 
In a case where the lack of reliable data or the complexity of the 
structure of a new type of financial instrument or the quality of 
information available is not satisfactory or raises serious questions as 
to whether a credit rating agency can provide a credible credit rating, 
the credit rating agency shall refrain from issuing a credit rating or 
withdraw an existing rating.254 
The revised IOSCO Code of Conduct contains similar language, 
but only recommends that the CRA should update ratings when 
it is reasonable to do so; it does not mandate that the CRA 
necessarily withdraw a rating.255 Whether the methodology of a 
particular credit rating meets the criteria of the EU CRA 
Regulation is a matter of interpretation and opinion.256 This 
provision raises concerns that CRAs will be deterred from 
expressing views on more complex structures, which would not 
increase transparency. This provision is also potentially 
contrary to the best interest of the market as it is likely that 
investors value the opinion of an independent and experienced 
third party when they are making investment decisions for 
complex products.257 If CRAs are prevented from publishing 
ratings in these circumstances, it may inhibit the movement of 
information in the markets and weaken investor confidence.258 
Most importantly, this provision appears to intrude on CRA 
independence, in direct violation of the U.S. Rating Agency Act’s 
prohibition of regulating the substance, procedures, or 
methodologies used by CRAs. Constraining CRA independence 
in this way could even impair the credibility of the European 
capital market and disadvantage European issuers and 
investors in relation to their international counterparts, thereby 
 
 253. Id. 
 254. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § D I(4) (emphasis 
added). 
 255. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.9(c). 
 256. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, para. 4.5(e). 
 257. Id. para. 5.6; see also Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, 
supra note 198, at 2 (stating that CRAs may be prevented from publishing 
unpopular but candid and objective commentary on structured finance instruments 
when many investors value credit ratings precisely because they are independent, 
objective, and for the benefit of the market rather than any individual). 
 258. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 2. 
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raising the cost of capital.259 
The EU CRA Regulation additionally requires that the 
CRAs “adopt, implement and enforce adequate measures to 
ensure that the credit ratings it issues are based on a thorough 
analysis of all the information that is available to it” and also 
“adopt all necessary measures so that the information it uses in 
assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from reliable 
sources.”260 The IOSCO Code of Conduct, on the other hand, 
only suggests that CRAs adopt “reasonable measures so that the 
information it uses in assigning a rating is of sufficient quality 
to support a credible rating.”261 The EU CRA Regulation is 
viewed by CRAs as creating an unprecedented affirmative duty 
to conduct due diligence on all underlying information used in 
ratings.262 This raises several concerns. First, if the EU 
interprets these verification regulations as making CRAs liable 
for the quality of the due diligence performed, it exposes the 
CRAs to legal liability.263 Second, this could lead to greater 
reliance on credit ratings, contrary to the goal of the European 
Commission.264 Third, there may be instances when conducting 
due diligence is not possible because it is prohibited by law, the 
information is unavailable for review, or there is such a large 
volume of information that it would be unworkable.265 Given the 
hundreds of thousands of ratings some CRAs assign globally, 
obligating a CRA to verify all underlying information used in a 
rating would be overly burdensome and could potentially bring 
operations to a halt.266 Finally, this requirement is inconsistent 
with the fundamental role CRAs play in the financial 
markets.267 
The EU CRA Regulation also requires CRAs to review their 
credit ratings and methodologies at least annually.268 The 
revised IOSCO Code of Conduct, on the other hand, only states 
that CRAs should establish a review function responsible for 
periodically reviewing the methodologies in such a manner that 
 
 259. Id. 
 260. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 8(2). 
 261. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.7. 
 262. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 7. 
 263. See, e.g., Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, 
para. 9.2. 
 264. See Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 20. 
 265. Id. at 7 n.19. 
 266. Id. at 19–20. 
 267. Letter from Larry G. Mayewski to European Comm’n, supra note 202, at 6. 
 268. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 8(5). 
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is “consistent with the applicable rating methodology.”269 
Requiring CRAs to review their methods annually encourages a 
one-size-fits-all depth of review that could result in wasting 
resources on reviews of uncontroversial methods which already 
produce a stable rating performance.270 This also raises a 
concern about the U.S. Rating Agency Act’s prohibition on 
regulating the procedures or methodologies used in determining 
ratings.271 
Additionally, the EU CRA Regulation requires that when a 
methodology, model, or key rating assumption changes, the CRA 
must immediately disclose the change and the likely scope of the 
credit ratings affected, review the affected credit ratings within 
six months of the change, and re-rate all ratings affected by the 
changed methodologies.272 The IOSCO Code of Conduct only 
recommends that CRAs publicly disclose material modifications 
to its methodologies, and does not contain any provisions 
suggesting that CRAs review and re-rate previously issued 
credit ratings.273 Because CRAs must review all affected credit 
ratings within a fixed time of six months after the change, this 
could significantly deter CRAs from undertaking major 
alterations to methodologies if it is unclear that the review can 
be completed within the allotted time frame.274 Furthermore, 
requiring CRAs to disclose the scope of credit ratings likely to be 
implicated could generate market volatility. If a CRA is required 
to indicate the potential direction of a rating immediately 
following a methodological change without having yet done a 
thorough analysis and review, the market could overreact.275 
 
 269. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 1.9(b). 
 270. Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at 8 
(responding to article 12(4) of the Commission’s proposed regulations (now article 
8(5) of the current regulation)); see also Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria 
Valentza, supra note 198, at 23 (arguing that codifying a timeline would be 
inappropriate since it may be necessary to conduct more or less frequent reviews). 
 271. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, ¶ 10.1 
(encouraging the Commission to align its regulations with the SEC Rules concerning 
the practice of CRAs relying on existing ratings from other CRAs). 
 272. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 8(6). 
 273. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 3.10. 
 274. Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at 8–9 
(responding to article 12(5) of the Commission’s proposed regulations (now article 
8(6) of the current regulation)). 
 275. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 22; see 
also HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 20 (arguing that an enforced re-rating of 
securities that are meeting original expectations could send out misleading 
messages and create unnecessary costs in the market). 
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D. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY  
Both the U.S. and EU regulations contain detailed 
provisions pertaining to disclosure and transparency, but the 
disclosures required by the EU CRA Regulation are more far-
reaching than those required by the U.S. Rating Agency Act. 
Both require, among other things, the disclosure of conflicts of 
interest,276 organizational structure,277 codes of conduct,278 a list 
of the largest twenty clients by revenue,279 and 
methodologies.280 The EU CRA Regulation additionally requires 
disclosure of the general nature of compensation 
arrangements,281 material modifications made to systems, 
resources and procedures,282 a list of all ancillary services 
provided by the CRA,283 as well as disclosure of various 
policies.284 While perhaps burdensome, these added disclosures 
do not create any specific hurdles for CRAs, considering the 
revised IOSCO Code of Conduct already recommends CRAs 
make many of these disclosures,285 and the U.S. regulation 
requires CRAs to maintain records pertaining to many of these 
 
 276. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(I)(1), 
with 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(vi) (2006). 
 277. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(III)(1), 
with 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(iv) (2006). 
 278. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(I)(7), 
with 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(v) (2006). 
 279. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § 
E(II)(2)(a) (requiring such information be made public), with 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
7(a)(1)(B)(viii) (2006) (allowing such information to be kept confidential). The EU 
CRA Regulation also requires CRAs disclose a list of clients 
[w]hose contribution to the growth rate in the generation of revenue of the 
credit rating agency in the previous financial year exceeded the growth 
rate in the total revenues of the credit rating agency in that year by a 
factor of more than 1.5 times. Any such client shall be included on the list 
only where, in that year, it accounted for more than 0.25% of the worldwide 
total revenues of the credit rating agency at global level. 
Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(II)(2)(b). 
 280. Compare Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(I)(5), 
with 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(iii) (2006). 
 281. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(I)(4). 
 282. Id. annex I, § E(I)(6). 
 283. Id. annex I, § E(I)(2). 
 284. See id. annex I, § E(I)(3) (requiring disclosure of the policy concerning 
publication of credit ratings); id. annex I, § E(III)(4) (requiring disclosure of the 
record-keeping policy); id. annex I, § E(III)(6) (requiring disclosure of the 
management and rating analyst rotation policy). 
 285. See IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.8 (compensation 
arrangements); id. § 3.3 (rating presentation policy); id. § 3.9 (unsolicited rating 
policy); id. § 3.10 (material modifications). 
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items.286 
In addition to the disclosure of methodologies required by 
both the U.S. and EU regulations, the EU CRA Regulation 
requires CRAs to publicly disclose “descriptions of models and 
key rating assumptions such as mathematical or correlation 
assumptions used in its credit rating activities.”287 Moody’s 
raised concerns that this places too much weight on models and 
could lead users of ratings to discount the significance of 
qualitative factors, mistakenly treat credit opinions as 
statements of fact, or view deviations from models as evidence of 
a CRA’s failure to follow procedure.288 Moreover, rating analysts 
and ratings committees might be discouraged from exercising 
their independent judgment, which could in turn negatively 
affect the quality and usefulness of credit ratings altogether.289 
The EU and U.S. regulations also differ on the extent to 
which CRAs must disclose credit ratings. The EU CRA 
Regulation requires CRAs to “disclose any credit rating, as well 
as any decision to discontinue a credit rating, on a non-selective 
basis and in a timely manner,” including credit ratings that are 
distributed by subscription.290 The U.S. only requires CRAs to 
make all credit ratings available either twelve or twenty-four 
months after the rating action is taken,291 with a random 
sample of 10% of the outstanding issuer-paid credit ratings for 
each class of credit ratings for which it has issued 500 or more 
outstanding credit ratings made publicly available six months 
after the rating action is taken.292 
The SEC believes that this amount of disclosure is sufficient 
because it should result in a substantial amount of new 
information and allow market observers to analyze the 
 
 286. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2(a) (2009) (effective Feb. 1, 2010) (requiring, 
among other things, that CRAs maintain records on the identity of any credit 
analyst(s) that participated in determining the rating, the identity of the person that 
approved the rating, any rationale for a material difference between the rating 
implied by the model and the final rating issued, whether a rating was solicited or 
unsolicited, a list of the general types of services and products offered, and 
compliance reports). 
 287. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § E(I)(5). 
 288. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 26. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 10(1). 
 291. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17g-2(d)(3)(i)(B), (C) (2009) (effective Feb. 1, 2010) 
(requiring disclosure of all obligor paid ratings twelve months after rating release 
and disclosure of non-obligor paid ratings twenty-four months after rating release). 
 292. Id. § 240.17g-2(d)(2) (requiring information to be made publicly available on 
the CRAs’ websites). 
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information and develop performance metrics.293 The EU CRA 
Regulation’s complete public disclosure requirement of all credit 
ratings, both issuer and subscriber paid, could reduce 
competition and have an adverse impact on CRAs that make 
money from selling ratings.294 Instead, the SEC argues that the 
level of disclosure called for in the U.S. regulations will likely 
enhance competition by making it easier for smaller CRAs to 
establish a proven track record of determining accurate 
ratings.295 
In an attempt to make the rating process more transparent, 
the EU CRA Regulation requires CRAs to make historical 
performance data available in a central repository established 
by CESR.296 This data is required for all credit ratings “(i) 
issued or endorsed by credit rating agencies registered in the 
Community, or (ii) issued by any certified credit rating agency 
which are disclosed publicly or distributed by subscription,” but 
preferably for all credit ratings issued globally.297 CESR 
requested that CRAs submit historical rating performance data 
covering at least the previous ten years before the regulation 
took force.298 Many CRAs have objected to free access to 
historical data because such information is currently available 
only to paid subscribers.299 CESR, however, has yet to put any 
 
 293. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59342, 74 Fed. Reg. 6456, 6460 (Feb. 9, 
2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b). 
 294. Id. at 6461. 
 295. Id. at 22. 
 296. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 11(2) (requiring 
disclosure of historical performance data “including the ratings transition frequency 
and information about credit ratings issued in the past and on their changes”). The 
CRAs can supply CESR with raw data and CESR will compile the performance 
statistics itself. CESR, Feedback Statement: CESR’s Consultation on CRAs Central 
Repository, ¶ 9, CESR/09-822a, (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/ 
popup2.php?id=6143 [hereinafter CESR, Feedback Statement]. 
 297. CESR, Feedback Statement, supra note 296, ¶ 11. Reporting must be 
consistent across all asset classes and an explanation is required if a non-global 
approach is taken. Id. ¶ 15. 
 298. See CESR, Consultation Document: CRAs Central Repository, ¶ 66, 
CESR/09-579, (July 9, 2009), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/ 
popup2.php?id=5795 [hereinafter CESR, Consultation Document]. Both Moody’s and 
S&P are unclear about the time frame for historic data desired by CESR. See Letter 
from Federic Drevon, Senior Managing Dir., Moody’s Investors Serv., to Comm. of 
Sec. Regulators, 8 (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/ 
popup_responses.php?id=4783; Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, Response Dated 
7 August 2009 to CESR Consultation Paper on CRA Central Repository, 3 (Aug. 7, 
2009), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup_responses.php?id=4787. 
 299. See Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 37 
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measures in place to address those concerns.300 
The EU CRA Regulation also contains substantial 
disclosure requirements pertaining to the presentation of 
ratings.301 CRAs are required to state the names and titles of 
the lead rating analysts and primary person responsible for 
approving the rating,302 to indicate the material sources which 
were used to prepare the credit rating,303 to state the 
methodology used to determine the rating,304 to provide 
appropriate risk warnings, and to state any attributes and 
limitations of the rating.305 The extensive presentation 
requirements are extremely burdensome on CRAs because each 
rating reflects opinions based on large amounts of information 
from numerous sources,306 all of which would need to be 
disclosed in order to provide a complete understanding of the 
rating. Furthermore, the regulation is vague, failing to provide 
any guidance on what is meant by phrases like “sensitivity 
analysis of the relevant assumptions.”307 These provisions seem 
aimed at curtailing investors’ excessive reliance on credit 
ratings by helping them understand the risks associated with 
the rated product or entity, but unless investors recognize that 
ratings only reflect credit risk, even these detailed disclosure 
requirements will do nothing to stop over-reliance on ratings.308 
Finally, CRAs are required by the EU CRA Regulation to 
file an annual transparency report which includes a description 
of the internal control mechanisms, statistics on the allocation 
of staff, a description of its record-keeping policy, and the 
outcome of an annual internal review of the independence 
compliance function.309 This essentially creates an entirely new 
disclosure system that is inconsistent with existing global norms 
 
(raising additional concerns that third parties could reformat the data and present it 
as their own); see also Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra 
note 210, at 9; Letter from Larry G. Mayewski to European Comm’n, supra note 202, 
at 4. 
 300. See generally CESR, Consultation Document, supra note 298. 
 301. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 10; id. annex I, § D. 
 302. Id. annex I, § D(I)(1). 
 303. Id. annex I, § D(I)(2)(a). 
 304. Id. annex I, § D(I)(2)(b). 
 305. Id. annex I, § D(I)(4) (requiring CRAs to disclose whether it considers the 
information available on the rated entity satisfactory and to what extent the CRA 
has verified information provided to it by the rated entity). 
 306. Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 42. 
 307. Id. 
 308. See HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 14. 
 309. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 12, annex I, § E(III). 
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and standards.310 Moody’s expressed specific concern that the 
disclosure requirements could have a chilling effect on internal 
compliance and discourage potential whistleblowers from 
reporting concerns.311 Despite these and other concerns, CESR 
has yet to issue any guidance as to how the transparency report 
requirements will be interpreted. 
E. STRUCTURED FINANCE INSTRUMENTS 
Regulators reacted to the heavy criticism of CRAs’ ratings 
of structured finance instruments by enacting specific provisions 
aimed directly at solving the problems brought to light by the 
subprime mortgage crisis.312 Unlike traditional corporate bond 
ratings, credit ratings of structured finance products are often 
viewed as seals of approval, which raises regulatory concerns 
given that CRAs generally do not confirm the validity of the 
underlying data provided to them.313 The EU CRA Regulation 
addresses this by requiring CRAs to “state what level of 
assessment it has performed concerning the due diligence 
processes carried out at the level of underlying financial 
instruments or other assets of structured finance 
instruments.”314 
The EU CRA Regulation also requires CRAs to explain the 
“assumptions, parameters, limits and uncertainties surrounding 
the models and rating methodologies used in [structured 
finance] credit ratings, including simulations of stress scenarios 
undertaken by the agencies when establishing the ratings.”315 
The revised IOSCO Code of Conduct contains a similar 
provision, asking a CRA to “disclose the degree to which it 
analyzes how sensitive a rating of a structured finance product 
is to changes in the CRA’s underlying rating assumptions.”316 
Additionally, both the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct and the 
EU CRA Regulation contain provisions requiring CRAs to 
 
 310. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 28. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See generally FIN. STABILITY FORUM, supra note 68 (providing 
recommendations such as implementing the Basel II capital framework); IOSCO, 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 70 (recommending a Code of Conduct focused on 
maintaining the quality of the ratings process, the independence of rating agencies, 
and CRAs’ responsibilities to the investing public). 
 313. IOSCO, FINAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 8. 
 314. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § D(II)(2). 
 315. Id. annex I, § D(II)(3). 
 316. IOSCO, REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 3.5(a). 
 444 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 19:2 
 
provide information about the loss and cash flow analysis it has 
performed or upon which it is relying.317 These provisions are 
aimed at addressing regulators’ concerns about a lack of 
independent means by which institutional investors can assess 
the risk of the securities.318 
The revised IOSCO Code of Conduct, EU CRA Regulation, 
and recent amendments to the rules promulgated pursuant to 
the U.S. Rating Agency Act all contain provisions aimed at 
promoting unsolicited ratings of structured finance products, 
thereby reducing “rating shopping.”319 The EU addresses this 
problem by requiring CRAs to disclose information about all 
structured finance products submitted for initial review or 
preliminary rating, regardless of whether issuers contract with 
the CRA for a final rating.320 The revised IOSCO Code of 
Conduct and the U.S. rules take a slightly different approach by 
requiring structured finance issuers to publicly disclose all 
information provided to the CRAs for use in determining the 
credit rating,321 an approach supported by the CRAs.322 
The U.S. regulation addresses the problem of rating 
shopping by first making it a conflict of interest for a CRA to 
provide a rating of any structured finance instrument paid for 
by the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter.323 A CRA is then 
prohibited from having a conflict of interest unless certain 
requirements are met. First, the CRA must maintain a 
password-protected website listing every structured finance 
instrument for which the CRA is currently in the process of 
determining an initial credit rating.324 Next, the CRA must 
provide other CRAs with unlimited access to this password-
protected website so long as the CRAs meet certain certification 
 
 317. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex I, § D(II)(1); IOSCO, 
REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 3.5(a). 
 318. See IOSCO, FINAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 9. 
 319. Rating shopping refers to CRAs being pressured into providing favorable 
ratings by asking different CRAs to provide prospective assessments of structured 
finance instruments before deciding which CRA to hire. See id. at 14. 
 320. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, annex 1 § D(II)(4). 
 321. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a)(3) (2009) (effective Feb. 1, 2010); IOSCO, 
REVISED CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, § 2.8(c). 
 322. See, e.g., Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, 
at 30. 
 323. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b)(9) (2009) (effective Feb. 1, 2010). 
 324. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(i). This list must be in chronological order and must 
identify the type of structured finance instrument, provide the name of the issuer, 
provide the date the rating process was initiated, and provide the website address 
where the issuer will disclose its required information. Id. 
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requirements.325 The hired CRA must then obtain a 
representation from the arranger of the structured finance 
instrument that the arranger will contemporaneously post on its 
own password-protected website for all certified CRAs to 
access326 all the information it provides the hired CRA for 
purposes of determining the initial credit rating327 or for 
purposes of undertaking credit rating surveillance.328 This 
includes information about the characteristics of the underlying 
assets, the legal structure of the instrument, and the 
performance of the assets.329 The hired CRA is provided some 
safe harbor if the arranger fails to comply with its disclosure 
requirements so long as the CRA reasonably relied on the 
arranger’s representation, taking into consideration factors such 
as prior failures by the arranger to adhere to its 
representations.330 
By requiring arrangers to make all the information given to 
retained CRAs available to all other CRAs, the U.S. regulation 
will improve the quality of credit ratings for structured finance 
products by making it possible for more CRAs to rate these 
instruments.331 The dissemination of these unsolicited ratings 
should then make it more difficult for arrangers to engage in 
rating shopping because the market will reveal ratings issued 
higher than warranted.332 At the same time, the requirements 
are not excessively burdensome on CRAs as they are only 
required to maintain minimal information on pending deals.333 
The only significant difference between the EU and U.S. 
regulations as they pertain to ratings of structured finance 
instruments is in the use of rating symbols. The EU CRA 
 
 325. See Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(ii). In order to be certified the CRA must state, 
among other things, that the CRA will determine and maintain ratings for at least 
10% of the structured finance instruments for which it accesses information if it 
accesses information for ten or more issued securities in the calendar year covered 
by the certification. See id. § 240.17g-5(e). 
 326. See id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii)(B). 
 327. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii)(C). 
 328. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii)(D). 
 329. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii)(C), (D). 
 330. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,847 
(Dec. 4, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b). 
 331. See id. at 63,851. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 63,854 (arguing that adding a portal for other CRAs to access 
pending deal information is not expected to require significant costs as all CRAs 
currently maintain websites with password-protected portals). 
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Regulation requires CRAs to differentiate credit ratings for 
structured finance instruments from traditional corporate debt 
instruments by using an additional symbol.334 Many CRAs 
objected to this requirement for various reasons.335 First, the 
rule directly contradicts strong investor sentiment, with over 
75% of investors surveyed by Moody’s strongly advising against 
changing the rating scale currently used.336 Many investors also 
expressed the view that simply adding a modifier for structured 
finance ratings would be a purely cosmetic change.337 Moreover, 
CRAs disapprove of the requirement because of the significant 
market costs involved in implementing changes in the rating 
symbols.338 From a practical perspective, there is no universally 
accepted definition of the term “structured finance,” making it 
difficult for CRAs to determine exactly which instruments 
require the additional symbol.339 It is also unlikely that the 
added symbol will adequately address investor’s 
misunderstandings about the risks associated with these 
products.340 Finally, and most importantly, the EU CRA 
Regulation creates significant international divergence in an 
area which had previously been consistent worldwide. 
F. OVERARCHING IMPLICATIONS OF THE EU CRA REGULATION 
While individually every requirement in the EU CRA 
Regulation appears to be reasonable and have a positive effect 
on the quality of ratings issued by CRAs, taken as a whole the 
requirements are over-burdensome, anti-competitive, and 
effectively export the EU’s regulatory regime to any country 
which headquarters a CRA wishing to issue ratings for use in 
 
 334. Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 10(3). 
 335. See Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, 
at 3; Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 210, at 9; 
Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 6–7. 
 336. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 24 
(surveying over 200 institutions representing over $9 trillion in fixed income assets 
under management). 
 337. See id.; Letter from Stephen W. Joynt to European Comm’n, supra note 
210, at 9. 
 338. See HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 13; Letter from Michel Madelain to 
Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 24. 
 339. Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 24 
(arguing that covered bonds, hybrid debt securities, trust preferred securities, 
warrants, and convertible bonds could be construed as forms of structured financing 
and fall within the requirement). 
 340. See id.; HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 21. 
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the EU. The EU CRA Regulation essentially ignores the fact 
that most CRAs are headquartered outside of the EU and 
therefore subject to various laws and regulations in their home 
country which do not conform to the detailed standards 
promulgated by the European Commission.341 
The extent of the extraterritorial and anti-competitive 
effects of the EU CRA Regulation turn on a few issues which 
have yet to be resolved. First, what does “systemically 
important” mean?342 If this term is defined too broadly, some of 
the affected CRAs may decline to establish a subsidiary within 
the EU as required by the endorsement provisions343 due to the 
large costs associated with such a venture.344 Second, what will 
happen if a credit rating agency or non-EU regulator cannot 
fulfill its obligations under the EU CRA Regulation because it is 
illegal in its host country? For example, many CRAs expressed 
concern that the corporate governance requirements intruded on 
shareholder rights or established standards in their home 
country, and it is thus likely that they could not comply with 
many of the EU’s requirements without violating a separate 
law.345 It seems unlikely that a non-EU regulator would alter its 
shareholder rights laws simply so that a few CRAs could comply 
with the EU CRA Regulation. Similar concerns were also raised 
in the context of the employment restrictions placed on 
analysts.346 
 
 341. See Letter from Vickie A. Tillman to DG MARKT, supra note 164, at 3. 
 342. The Financial Stability Board has issued a report providing guidance for 
national authorities on how to assess the systemic importance of financial 
institutions, markets, and instruments. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS & FIN. STABILITY BD., GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC 
IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL 
CONSIDERATIONS (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
publications/r_091107c.pdf (outlining conceptual and analytical approaches to the 
assessment of systemic importance and discussing a possible form for general 
guidelines). 
 343. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 4(3). 
 344. See Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, 
at 2; Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra note 179, at 4. 
 345. See Letter from Takefumi Emori to the European Comm’n, supra note 183, 
at 3 (explaining that term limits for non-executive board members could be found to 
be an excessive intrusion into the rights of shareholders); Letter from Michel 
Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 3 (stating that Moody’s complies 
with the New York Stock Exchange’s Corporate Governance Listing Standards, 
which differ from the EU CRA Regulation’s corporate governance standard). 
 346. See generally Letter from Yasuhiro Harada to Jörgen Holmquist, supra 
note 179, at 18; HM TREASURY, supra note 164, at 23; Letter from Michel Madelain 
to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 5. 
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The most pressing issue is how strictly the European 
regulators will make equivalency determinations. While it 
seems probable that exceptions could be made regarding 
corporate governance and disclosure requirements, it seems 
unlikely that the U.S. regulatory regime would be deemed 
equivalent in terms of rating methodologies and the quality of 
ratings given the significance EU regulators placed on these 
provisions. Specifically, because the United States prohibits 
regulators from interfering with the substance of ratings, or the 
procedures and methodologies used to determine ratings,347 
many of the requirements in the EU CRA Regulation would not 
be deemed legal in the United States.348 If this is in fact the 
case, U.S. regulators could not adopt these requirements in 
order to meet the EU’s equivalence requirements without first 
repealing the prohibition. The extraterritorial reach of the EU 
CRA Regulation in such a situation is extreme, forcing U.S. 
regulators to choose either to limit CRAs based in the United 
States who desire to issue ratings for use in the EU to the 
endorsement requirements, or to adopt provisions contrary to a 
key philosophy underlying its regulation of CRAs. 
G. SOLUTIONS: THE NEED FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND 
BILATERAL DIALOGUES 
Any potential extraterritorial and anti-competitive effects of 
the EU CRA Regulation could be substantially reduced if the 
European Union adopted an equivalency decision for the United 
States and Japan without forcing either country to implement 
the EU CRA Regulation in full. Because the regulations in the 
United States are essentially designed to achieve the same 
ultimate goals as the EU CRA Regulation,349 European 
 
 347. See Credit Rating Reform Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (2006). 
 348. See Letter from Michel Madelain to Maria Valentza, supra note 198, at 1–2 
(raising concerns that many of the provisions intrude on CRA independence and 
could lead CRAs to be discouraged or prevented from publishing candid and 
objective ratings). 
 349. Compare Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit Rating 
Agencies, at 4, COM (2008) 704 final (Nov. 12, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/securities/docs/agencies/proposal_en.pdf (listing avoidance of 
conflicts of interest, improving the quality of the methodologies, increasing 
transparency, and ensuring efficient registration and surveillance as the four 
primary objectives of the legislation), with Amendments to Rules for Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59342, 74 
Fed. Reg. 6456 (Feb. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b) (listing 
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regulators should deem the U.S. regulations equivalent to the 
EU regulation despite differences in the means used to achieve 
those goals, as was the case when the EU made prior 
equivalency determinations regarding financial reporting 
standards.350 The adoption of an equivalency determination is 
particularly important if the “at least as stringent” requirement 
in the endorsement provisions can only be met when the home 
country is deemed equivalent.351 If this is in fact how the 
regulation is interpreted, then any CRA whose home country is 
not deemed equivalent would be unable to make its ratings 
available for use in the European Union without establishing an 
affiliate in the EU, registering that entity, and conducting one 
hundred percent of its ratings activity in the European Union.352 
Such a conclusion could have a catastrophic impact on the 
financial markets in the European Union if non-EU based CRAs 
were unwilling to conduct all of their European rating activities 
in the EU. 
The most effective way to minimize potential regulatory 
gaps and address the regulatory frictions resulting from 
differing regulatory regimes is through international 
coordination and bilateral dialogues.353 Regulators in the U.S., 
EU, and around the globe should continue to work together 
toward the goals outlined by the G-20, achieving an “oversight 
framework . . . consistent across jurisdictions with appropriate 
sharing of information between national authorities, including 
through IOSCO.”354 Pursuant to these initiatives, “IOSCO has 
 
increasing transparency, strengthening disclosure of ratings performances, 
prohibiting certain conflicts of interest, and enhancing recordkeeping and reporting 
obligations as the primary goals of the rule amendments). 
 350. See Council Directive 2008/961, Commission Decision of 12 December 2008 
on the Use By Third Countries’ Issuers of Securities of Certain Third Country’s 
National Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards to 
Prepare Their Consolidated Financial Statements, 2008 O.J. (L 340) 112 (EC) 
(deeming the U.S. and Japanese Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
equivalent to the EU’s International Financial Reporting Standards despite 
significant differences). 
 351. See CESR, Call for Evidence, supra note 141, at 21 (arguing that the “at 
least as stringent” requirement for endorsement is the same as the equivalency 
determination required for certification). 
 352. See Council Regulation 1060/2009, supra note 16, art. 4(3)–(5). 
 353. See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, 
Testimony Concerning International Cooperation to Modernize Financial 
Regulation, Before the U.S. S. Banking Subcomm. on Sec. and Int’l Trade and Fin. 
(Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=a3381afe-030b-4c16-97df-d4b3e6d01c96. 
 354. U.S. CHAIR OF THE PITTSBURGH G-20 SUMMIT, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE 
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commenced a dialogue with CRAs and is examining whether 
differences in the implementation of national and regional 
regulatory frameworks . . . present compliance problems or 
arbitrage opportunities.”355 IOSCO is additionally conducting a 
regular dialogue between regulators and the CRAs regarding 
any implementation problems from the industry’s perspective.356 
It is crucial that CRAs and regulators continue to work together 
through IOSCO to ensure the regulatory system put in place 
meets the needs of investors and regulators alike. 
In particular, it is important the U.S. and EU work together 
through the U.S.-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue to 
ensure that equivalence determinations for CRAs follow an 
outcomes-based assessment rather than requiring an exact 
duplication of rules.357 This dialogue has been successful in the 
past, and members from both the U.S. and EU should use this 
forum yet again to ensure that the regulations are as compatible 
and as convergent as possible.358 Finally, CESR and the SEC 
should put together a plan as quickly as possible to guide the 
SEC-CESR dialogue in the immediate future to ensure the 
regulation of CRAs is globally consistent.359 
CONCLUSION  
In less than a decade, credit rating agencies have gone from 
self-regulated entities virtually ignored by regulators to entities 
subject to detailed regulatory regimes in both the United States 
and the EU. Spurred by issues which came to light due to the 
subprime mortgage crisis, regulators in both the EU and United 
States are seeking to regulate CRAs in order to increase 
 
ACTIONS TO PROMOTE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 19 (Sept. 25, 2009), available 
at http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_progress_report_250909.pdf. 
 355. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, PROGRESS SINCE THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT IN 
IMPLEMENTING THE G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 12 (Nov. 7, 2009), available at https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
publications/r_091107a.pdf. 
 356. Id. at 12–13. 
 357. TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC COUNCIL, JOINT REPORT ON U.S. – EU 
FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATORY DIALOGUE FOR THE TEC MEETING 1–2 (Oct. 27, 
2009), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/files/joint_report_on_fmrd_en.pdf 
(stating that U.S. and EU regulators are working together regarding equivalence). 
 358. Id. at 1. 
 359. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC and CESR Launch 
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transparency, strengthen disclosure, avoid conflicts of interest, 
and generally improve the quality of ratings to ensure that the 
problems highlighted by the recent financial turmoil are avoided 
in the future. While the goals are the same, the EU’s regulatory 
regime takes a much more prescriptive approach to regulation 
than both the IOSCO Code of Conduct and the U.S. Rating 
Agency Act, outlining detailed requirements pertaining to 
corporate governance and rating methodologies. 
The EU’s divergence from the international regulatory 
consensus, as reflected in the IOSCO Code of Conduct, would 
not be as significant if the EU CRA Regulation did not mandate 
that the regulatory regimes of non-EU CRAs must be deemed 
equivalent in order for such non-EU CRAs to issue credit ratings 
for use in the European Union. The EU now has the upper-hand 
when it comes to regulation of international credit rating 
agencies as it decides whether the standards set in other 
jurisdictions are sufficient. As a result, even where EU and U.S. 
regulations do not currently conflict, the SEC may face pressure 
not to adopt new rules for fear of creating conflicts with the EU 
regulations that could potentially harm U.S. rating agencies 
operating in Europe. It is thus essential that regulators work 
together through bilateral dialogues to ensure that the various 
regulations are compatible to eliminate the potential adverse 
cross-border impact different regulatory approaches may have 
on global market participants. 
